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THE  DEPRAVITY  OF  THE  1930S  AND  THE
MODERN  ADMINISTRATIVE  STATE
Steven G. Calabresi* & Gary Lawson**
Gillian Metzger’s 2017 Harvard Law Review foreword, entitled 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, is a paean to the modern administrative state, with its
massive subdelegations of legislative and judicial power to so-called “expert” bureaucrats, who
are layered well out of reach of electoral accountability yet do not have the constitutional status of
Article III judges.  We disagree with this celebration of technocratic government on just about
every level, but this Article focuses on two relatively narrow points.
First, responding more to implicit assumptions that pervade modern discourse than specifi-
cally to Professor Metzger’s analysis, we challenge the normally unchallenged premise that the
1930s was a decade of moral wisdom about governmental design that should serve as a ground
for constitutional reasoning that is superior to the actual text of the Constitution.  The 1930s
was a thoroughly awful time, worldwide and in the United States; and while America avoided
some of the very worst trends of those times (although it was a worldwide leader in others, such as
eugenics), the intellectual and political foundations of that decade were a terrible ground for
theories of government.  We do not make the absurd claim that everything that emerged from the
1930s was therefore bad simply by virtue of that origin, nor do we make the equally absurd ad
hominem claim that everyone who supports anything from the 1930s must support everything
from that time.  We only want to call into question the (generally implicit) premise that the
governmental forms of the 1930s are sacrosanct because that decade should be seen as the real
constitutional founding.  The intellectual foundations of the 1780s and 1860s—the decades
that led to the ratification of the actual constitutional text and the Civil War Amendments—are
far superior to those of the 1930s.  To be clear, we think that constitutional interpretation should
be about the Constitution, not about time periods, values, or constitutional “orders,” but if for
some reason one wants to focus on time periods, the 1930s should be the last time period to which
one looks for guidance.
Second, we offer some very modest legislative tweaks to the existing institutions of the admin-
istrative state that we believe will move American government more toward the correct constitu-
tional baseline with only minimal changes in actual governmental functions.  Major rules
should be enacted using constitutional (if expedited) lawmaking procedures; all executive officers
© 2018 Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Clayton J. & Henry R. Barber Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of
Law.  Professor Calabresi would like to thank Jim Lindgren, Philip Hamburger, and Shams
Hirji for comments, which were helpful to the writing of this Article.
** Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.  Professor Lawson is
grateful to Joseph Postell for advice, which Professor Lawson largely and unwisely ignored.
821
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 2 27-DEC-18 9:22
822 notre dame law review [vol. 94:2
should, by statute if not by constitutional command, be made removable at will by the President;
and all deprivations of life, liberty, and property by the federal government should be accom-
plished through due process of law, which means adjudication through an Article III tribunal.
None of these tweaks requires abolition of any federal agency or repeal of any substantive organic
statute.  Adopting them will not establish constitutional government.  But it will be better than
abandoning the enterprise altogether in favor of rule by “experts” deemed fit, by virtue of their
college degrees, to govern their unenlightened “lessers.”
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INTRODUCTION
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices,
and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.
He has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither Swarms of Officers to
harrass our People, and eat out their Substance.1
At Justice Elena Kagan’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing, she
famously said: “[W]e are all originalists.”2  We think that this pithy observa-
tion is clearly true.  Everyone is an originalist with respect to something.  This
includes the mass of scholars and judges who purport to reject originalism.
They do not actually object to originalism as a method for interpretation.
They only object to it as a method for interpretation and/or application of
the U.S. Constitution (and perhaps of statutes that they do not like).  Schol-
ars expect their books and articles to be read in light of their original
intended meanings, and judges expect their opinions to be read in light of
their original intended meanings.3  The question, if the goal is successful
human communication, is never whether one is seeking to ascertain original
1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 11–12 (U.S. 1776).
2 The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Elena
Kagan, Solicitor Gen. of the United States), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg67622/pdf/CHRG-111shrg67622.pdf.
3 One might add that legal scholars generally expect court opinions that they like to
be read in light of their original intended meanings.
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meaning.  The questions are always of what one is seeking to ascertain origi-
nal meaning and from when one is seeking to ascertain it.
Gillian Metzger’s 2017 Harvard Law Review Supreme Court foreword,
entitled 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,4 is an example of a
species of unacknowledged originalism in action.  Professor Metzger sees—
quite correctly—a growing set of judicial and academic concerns about the
constitutionality of much of the modern American government; and she is
afraid that those concerns, if taken seriously by real-world legal actors, might
place roadblocks in the path of her favored political agenda.  She accordingly
argues at great length that the vast machinery of the modern federal govern-
ment, which is typically described by the shorthand label “the administrative
state,”5 is constitutionally permissible—and is even constitutionally man-
dated.6  Her argument is strikingly originalist.  But instead of seeking to ascer-
tain the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution, using sources such as
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton, she instead tries
to ascertain the original meaning of nonconstitutional ideas and institutions
crafted in the 1930s, using sources such as James Landis, Louis Brownlow,
and Felix Frankfurter, all of whom were either scholars or officials in Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal administration.
As do many modern academics and judges, Metzger starts her constitu-
tional analysis in the 1930s.  She takes the New Deal revolution as the big
bang, which establishes the framework from which all subsequent legal analy-
sis must proceed: “[W]e are seeing a resurgence of the antiregulatory and
antigovernment forces that lost the battle of the New Deal.”7  She complains
that accepting the constitutional critique of the administrative state “would
4 Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
5 The shorthand term “the administrative state” might actually mislead more than it
clarifies, but its use is probably too pervasive to avoid.  As Metzger points out on multiple
occasions, see id. at 4–5, 8, 65, there are many dimensions to modern government, ranging
from the military to Social Security to immigration controls to environmental regulation to
occupational licensing.  Those large categories themselves conceal enormous variation; the
military includes both crack SEAL teams and bloated bureaucracies, while environmental
regulation includes both toxic waste cleanups and overbearing wetlands encroachments.
No one except an anarchist (which happens to describe one of us, but never mind) will
oppose everything and anything contained within the enormity of the administrative state.
By the same token, however, thinking that the crack SEAL teams or border enforcement
against MS-13 are good things does not commit one to loving non–Article III administra-
tive adjudication or wealth-destroying regulations.  When we inveigh against the “adminis-
trative state” in this Article, we are admittedly being selective about which parts of modern
government we include within that label.  Indeed, our objections in this Article go more to
the form in which modern administration is run than to its substance.  We each have
plenty, and often quite different, problems with much of the substance as well, but the
overlapping consensus on which we base this collaboration concerns the way in which ordi-
nary citizens are subjected to unconstitutional bureaucratic tyranny, whether or not that
tyranny is, in some fashion, for their own good or for the purported good of someone else.
6 Id. at 86–91.
7 Id. at 2.
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require a reformation of the constitutional order that has governed for the
last eighty years.”8  Any deviation from post-1930s institutional or intellectual
developments is evidently suspect, and even sinister.9
We think it is liberty and republicanism that are under siege today from
a bloated, arbitrary and capricious, dictatorial, elitist, electorally unaccounta-
ble,10 and largely unconstitutional administrative state.  As have progressives
from the nineteenth century onward, Metzger celebrates the independence
of the professionalized deep state, run by credentialed “experts,” from politi-
cal control.11  Her argument is merely one piece of a much wider phalanx
supporting modern bureaucratic government.  Professor Jon Michaels, for
example, has similarly defended “the project of twentieth-century administra-
tive governance as a normatively and constitutionally virtuous one.”12  We
consider this wrong on every possible level.  We think, along with Lord
Acton, that “[p]ower tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely.”13  We believe in liberty and republican democracy14 and not in gov-
ernment by Platonic philosopher kings who call themselves experts by virtue
of their self-sanctioned credentials.  More fundamentally, we believe in the
8 Id. at 64.
9 Much of Metzger’s article emphasizes that opposition to the administrative state has
long been associated with certain business interests and (the horror of it all) conservatives.
Id. at 64–69.  She even manages to bring the Koch brothers into it. Id. at 67–68.
10 Metzger goes to great lengths to try to show that actors within the administrative
state really are accountable in many and varied ways. Id. at 77–85.  We urge the reader to
examine carefully Metzger’s discussion and to think about to whom the technocrats are
accountable under the mechanisms that she presents.  Spoiler alert: the technocrats are
“accountable” to each other and to various other members of the credentialed class.  Ordi-
nary citizens are supposed to sit there, shut up, and be ruled by their better-pedigreed
superiors, secure in the knowledge that the wise ones with advanced degrees will conform
to self-approved norms.
11 Id. at 80–81.
12 JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 4 (2017).
13 Letter from Lord Acton to Archbishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), reprinted
in LECTURES ON MODERN HISTORY (John Neville Figgis & Reginald Vere Laurence eds.,
1906) [hereinafter Letter from Acton to Creighton], http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/acton-
acton-creighton-correspondence#lf1524_label_010.
14 To be sure, Professor Lawson does not believe that democracy, whether republican
or otherwise, can carry moral weight as a matter of first principles of political theory. See
Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits
of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 n.51 (2012).  He does, however, see it, in
Churchillian fashion, as contingently preferable to other institutional arrangements that
are currently on the available menu.  It absolutely crushes rule by the present credentialed
class.
More broadly, Professor Lawson generally avoids engaging in any kind of normative
scholarship, preferring to confine himself to positive claims about objective legal meaning.
In the spirit of a coauthored project, however, he is prepared here to sign onto some
claims that he ordinarily would not make in a scholarly setting.  To be clear, he is fine with
all of those claims.  He just ordinarily would not make them outside the context of a fully
elaborated moral and political theory.
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Constitution as it is written, not in a faux “constitution” dreamed up by aca-
demics, lawyers, and politicians in the dreadful era of the 1930s.  We are thus
advocates of what Michaels calls “rote constitutional formalism,”15 though we
prefer to call it “constitutionalism.”
If one is going to engage in an originalist enterprise, as everyone does in
some fashion, it is vital to make sure that one is interpreting the right thing
and is doing it from the right time frame.  We begin in Part I with the time
frame by considering whether constitutional interpreters ought to select as
their starting point the 1930s or whether they should begin reasoning from
the 1780s, the 1860s, or even the post–World War II era, as we believe.  We
are not aware of any canonical normative defense of the 1930s as the proper
time frame for grounding constitutional interpretation, except perhaps in
Yale Law School Professor Bruce Ackerman’s We the People series of books.16
That is not surprising, because in the milieu of the legal academy, the need
for such a defense would not normally be evident; the sanctity of the New
Deal, and all that generated it, functions as a postulate of quasi religious
significance.  Nor do we think that good arguments for that choice are easily
found.  Indeed, if there was a worse time frame from which to begin constitu-
tional reasoning, it does not leap to mind.
We then turn in Parts II and III to the proper object of constitutional
interpretation, which is the actual Constitution.  We conclude that certain
features of the federal17 administrative state—namely, massive subdelega-
tions of legislative and judicial power to appointed technocrats who are not
directly accountable to the President—are unconstitutional through numer-
ous violations of the separation of powers, that they violate Magna Carta and
the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that they are
bad ideas as a matter of policy; and we offer some quite modest suggestions
that might incrementally help restore the Constitution and the rule-of-law
tradition on which it is founded.
The gap between our strong rhetoric in Part I and our somewhat timid
suggestions in Part II fits well with Metzger’s observations about precisely that
pervasive divide in scholarly and judicial objections to the administrative
state, where the sound and fury of harsh rhetoric criticizing modern adminis-
tration often signifies, if not quite nothing, then at least very little.18  We do
not find this seeming mismatch between rhetoric and reform as noteworthy
as does she.  What one thinks is right as a matter of first principles and what
one thinks is achievable in the here and now will not always match up well.
15 MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 9.
16 These books by Ackerman include: BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUND-
ING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005); 1
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);
and 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
17 It is very possible that a good many state and local administrative institutions are
unconstitutional as well, but that is a story for another time.
18 See Metzger, supra note 4, at 46–51.
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That is not an argument for neglecting the first principles.  It is an argument
for trumpeting the first principles loudly and often until they change the
frontier of what is possible.  Indeed, Metzger and others have noted, with
some dismay, this phenomenon of changing frontiers regarding governmen-
tal structure.19  Of course, if one likes the status quo, one will naturally be
resistant to anything that might change it.  Metzger’s article is therefore not
merely originalist; it is starkly, and literally, conservative.  There is, of course,
nothing per se wrong with being conservative.  Our objection is that Metz-
ger’s analysis seeks to conserve key elements of the post-1930s governmental
structure that deserve to be swept away.
In sum, we think that in Metzger’s article and the larger wave of scholar-
ship that it represents, we are seeing a resurgence of the antiliberty and
antirepublican forces that lost the Battle of Yorktown.20
I. LOOKING TO THE 1930S?
Metzger argues that the present-day foes of the administrative state are
wrongly trying to upend decisions to create, or “build out,”21 the administra-
tive state which she says were conclusively made during the 1930s.  They are
trying, in her words, to enact “a reformation of the constitutional order that
has governed for the last eighty years.”22  Her argument assumes—indeed,
takes as axiomatic—that the constitutional order of the last eighty years has
been sound and that such a reformation would therefore be a form of heresy.
That perceived soundness cannot come from conformance of that order to
the actual Constitution.  It must come instead from some normative under-
pinning that is considered superior to the Constitution itself.  Metzger’s argu-
ment, as do the arguments of many other contemporary legal actors, rests on
the premise that the New Deal revolution of the 1930s, including its open
abandonment of some of the most basic separation of powers principles in
the Constitution, emerged from a fount of moral wisdom so powerful in its
force and so esteemed in its pedigree that it serves as a postulate for constitu-
tional reasoning.  This premise is so deeply ingrained that the term “New
Deal settlement” has become a standard part of legal discourse.23
Even if the premise were true, it would perhaps justify seeking formal
amendment of the Constitution to validate some or all of the New Deal
revolution; it would not justify shifting the object of constitutional interpreta-
19 See id. at 68.
20 On the royalist origins of much of modern administrative law, see PHILIP
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
21 Metzger, supra note 4, at 6.
22 Id. at 64.
23 The first appearance of the term that we find comes from Charles H. Clarke,
Supreme Court Assault on the Constitutional Settlement of the New Deal: Garcia and National
League of Cities, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 39, 79 (1986).  A simple Westlaw search of “‘new deal’
/s settle!” yielded 165 hits on July 19, 2018.  The number of appearances of the term in
workshop discussions and faculty lounge conversations is not precisely measurable; “lots” is
a safe guess based on our experiences.
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tion from the Constitution to extraconstitutional institutions and ideas.  We
do not doubt that many New Deal developments—Social Security and federal
labor laws leap immediately to mind—would today easily secure the necessary
votes for ratification if they were put forward as formal constitutional amend-
ments.  But keeping the baby does not necessarily carry the bathwater with it.
We want to challenge the generally unchallenged premise that accepting
as given some of the developments of the 1930s24 requires accepting all of
those developments, including those that fundamentally altered the charac-
ter and structure of American constitutional government.  Even more deeply,
we want to challenge the generally unchallenged premise that, concerning
normative theories of governance, the 1930s was a great leap forward that
ought to command more respect than does the Constitution itself.  A full
treatment of that subject would obviously require a multivolume treatise on
moral and political theory, including a detailed normative assessment of each
institution that emerged from each compared time.  This is a relatively short
law review article, and we can accordingly focus here only on one narrow
piece of that much larger puzzle.  Because we perceive that the legal acad-
emy—and here we are really using Metzger as a foil for wider trends that we
both have observed for thirty years rather than directly engaging her or her
specific arguments—has a pronounced, and to us inexplicable, fondness for
the 1930s; we therefore consider the relative constitutional and normative
desirability of deferring to major decisions made during three decades (with
a modest detour into modern times): (1) the 1930s; (2) the 1780s; and (3)
the 1860s.  We conclude that it is wrong on every level to argue for deference
to decisions made in the 1930s on the premise that this was an ennobling
decade that ought to be the starting point for constitutional reasoning.  We
do not specify here which decade we are convinced was the best of times, but
the 1930s was definitely the worst of times.  Why anyone would choose that
decade as the jumping-off point for constitutional reasoning, without being
compelled to do so by an authoritative text, is beyond our comprehension.
To be as clear as we can possibly be: we think that the proper object of
constitutional interpretation is the Constitution, not the ethos or zeitgeist of
any particular time period.  Constitutional interpretation is about texts, not
times (or values, or constitutional “orders”); times serve only to fix the con-
ceptual framework necessary for understanding the texts.  Nor are we making
the transparently stupid claim that every decision and institution that
emerged from the 1930s anywhere in the world must be bad because it came
from that time.25  We are simply responding to the widespread, and even
predominant, assumption in the legal academy that the 1930s is a time
period deserving of special constitutional solicitude, such that decisions of
that era about the structure of government should presumptively have a text-
24 Professor Lawson accepts some of those developments as given, in the minimalist
sense that there is no prospect in his lifetime that they will ever change.  As a libertarian,
he does not accept them as normatively desirable as a matter of first principles.
25 Similarly, it would be transparently stupid to argue that every decision and institu-
tion that emerged from a time in which slavery was widely recognized must be bad.
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trumping stature.  Accordingly, our focus is not so much on the parade of
horribles from that decade—which, as we will describe, is a shatteringly long
and tragic parade—but on the wider, more abstract intellectual trends of the
time that influenced governmental institutional design.  The 1930s was not
just a time of misery and human suffering.  It was a time, worldwide and in
the United States, of truly awful ideas about government, about humanity,
and about the fundamental unit of moral worth—ideas which, even in rela-
tively benign forms, have institutional consequences that we think should be
fiercely resisted.  If we are thereby refighting battles of the 1930s, we think at
least some of those battles are very much worth refighting.
In the end, as we have already foreshadowed, the tweaks that we propose
to the modern administrative state in Part II are very modest.  Even people
who subscribe to all or most of the substantive missions that the federal gov-
ernment has assumed in the past eighty years should, we think, be able to
sign onto our concrete program.  Indeed, many of our suggestions have been
made independently by others, surrounded by fewer bells and whistles.26  We
could frankly offer that program without describing the horror—both politi-
cal and intellectual—of the 1930s.  But that horror bears revisiting.  The
1930s was not a golden age which we should all aspire to emulate and
develop.  While it is certainly possible to argue that some of the institutions
that emerged from that era are good, that is not enough to ground conversa-
tion-stopping claims to the effect that, “Oh, but that challenges the New Deal
settlement.”  The parts of that so-called settlement that we address in this
Article wholly deserve to be unsettled.  If it takes an all-out assault on the
1930s to get that conversation moving, so be it.
That conversation, once it starts moving, can take many forms.  It can
explore the appropriate roles of constitutional text and precedent in consti-
tutional adjudication.  It can examine the extent to which adjudication
should be based on moral or political theory rather than the Constitution.  It
can consider whether certain parts of the Constitution should simply be dis-
carded.  It can even involve assessment of whether the Constitution should
openly be scrapped altogether.  Those are all conversations worth having.
Our only concern in this Part of this Article is to counter one rhetorical
move—“The 1930s was a great time from which to draw constitutional princi-
ples”—with another—“No, it really wasn’t.”  Any argument that does not take
as a key premise the goodness of the 1930s as a ground for constitutional
reasoning has nothing to fear from our analysis.
A. It Was the Worst of Times
Although the roots of modern government run deep, and the founda-
tions for much of what we see around us were laid in the late eighteenth and
26 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Classical Liberal Administrative Law in a Progressive
World, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CLASSICAL LIBERAL THOUGHT 105 (M. Todd Hen-
derson ed., 2018).
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early nineteenth centuries,27 and even earlier,28 the modern administrative
state, and especially those features of it which occupy our attention in Parts II
and III, really had its origin in the 1930s.29  President FDR’s administration
and a compliant Congress created a vast array of new “expert” regulatory
agencies, many of which followed the “independent” model by insulating the
agency heads from at-will presidential removal, and many of which contained
(and still contain) statutory authorizations to the agencies so vague as to be
literally meaningless.  Many of those “expert” agencies involved the national
government in matters that had previously been left to the states, ranging
from securities regulation to labor law to agricultural production quotas.
These agencies, controlled neither by the President nor by Congress, made
life-altering decisions of both fact and law subject only to deferential judicial
review, often without the involvement of juries.  They existed in this form
because a nontrivial set of Woodrow Wilson’s Progressives and FDR’s New
Dealers fundamentally did not believe that all men are created equal and
should democratically govern themselves through representative institutions.
They believed instead that there were “experts”—the modern descendants of
Platonic philosopher kings, distinguished by their academic pedigrees rather
than the metals in their souls—who should administer the administrative
state as freely as possible from control by representative political institutions.
As a Columbia professor put it in 1913, they opposed a representative system
in which “the ignorant rule the enlightened and the vulgar rule the
refined.”30  It takes little imagination to visualize who the esteemed professor
thinks gets to define enlightenment31 and refinement.32
To be sure, the eighteenth-century founders were not advocates of Athe-
nian democracy.  They crafted a representative scheme of constitutional gov-
ernment to minimize the risks of popular passions, they created the Senate
with the hope and expectation that it would be filled with people more wise
and sober than the norm, and they filtered presidential elections through the
electoral college.  They also hoped that the life-tenured members of the
Supreme Court and of the inferior federal courts would protect against mob
27 See Ronald J. Pestritto, The Progressive Origins of the Administrative State: Wilson, Good-
now, and Landis, 24 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 16, 17–21 (2007).
28 See JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHAL-
LENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 13–165 (2017).
29 See Metzger, supra note 4, at 51–52.
30 HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 371 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pro-
fessor John Burgess, Columbia University).
31 Is an advanced degree in postmodern philosophy, or modern economics, or politi-
cal science, a better badge of enlightenment than years of Bible study, a careful reading of
Atlas Shrugged, or (as with Professor Lawson’s father) a nondegreed lifetime of twelve-hour
days as an animal feed salesman?  If so, prove it by something other than ipse dixit.  None of
this is meant to denigrate the value of advanced degrees, which both of us obviously pos-
sess.  It is only to challenge the idea that those degrees ought to be a source of special
political and moral privilege that marks out the favored caste.
32 The construction of a footnote parallel to note 31, supra, is left as an exercise for
the reader.
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rule.  The Constitution is republican, not democratic.  It does not guarantee
to every state a democratic form of government; it guarantees to every state
“a Republican Form of Government.”33  Nonetheless, under the original con-
stitutional scheme,34 all persons who exercise federal legislative or executive
power are electorally accountable at some point, either directly or through
election of state legislatures.
The New Deal model, by contrast, contemplates a massive exercise of
power by executive and independent agency officials35 who are much farther
removed from accountability to the electorate than was even the original Sen-
ate.  Those “expert” officials36 do not simply advise citizens and legislators, as
a doctor might advise a patient.  The officials have formal legal power to
make significant, and even life-and-death, decisions.  Their role under the
New Deal model is not to serve as wise counselors to autonomous individuals
and elected representatives; it is to serve as guardians for servile wards.  It is
fair to say that the New Deal fundamentally transformed both the scope and
the form of modern government by largely replacing representative democ-
racy with a government of “experts.”
We think it is trivially true that this transformation of the national gov-
ernment was not authorized by the Constitution.37  Nor was the Constitution
amended in the 1930s to authorize the creation of an extraconstitutional
administrative state.  The Constitution provided in the 1930s, as it does today,
for a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial power, in which depriva-
33 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
34 We are here describing the Constitution before the Seventeenth Amendment
extended popular election to the Senate.  The ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment,
and the numerous post-1865 amendments expanding voting rights, strengthens our point
about the republican character of the Constitution.
35 See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 417–19 (2007).
36 Some of those officials might well be bona fide experts.  Others might be partisan
hacks, incompetent, entirely lacking in judgment beyond their narrow sphere of learning,
or some combination thereof.  We often employ quotation marks in this article around the
term “expert” as a reminder that labels are not always accurate.  But sometimes they are, so
we will not use the quotation marks in every instance.
37 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231
(1994) [hereinafter Lawson, Rise of the Administrative State].  At this point, the voice of
Adrian Vermeule interjects that the modern administrative state has been repeatedly dem-
ocratically ratified by the consistent election of representatives who created, sustained, and
expanded it: “We have an administrative state that has been created and limited by the
sustained and bipartisan action of Congress and the President over time; that is supervised
and checked by the President as it operates; and that has been blessed by an enduring
bipartisan consensus on the Supreme Court.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM
LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 46 (2016).  All true.  That may even, as
Vermeule avers, confer a measure of democratic legitimacy on the enterprise. Id.  But it
does not confer republican—meaning constitutional—legitimacy upon it.  That could only
come from valid ratification of constitutional amendments.  Perhaps some of the institu-
tions to which we object could secure such ratification today.  We will never know until the
advocates of those institutions give it a try.
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tions of life, liberty, and property require due process of law.  Many aspects of
the administrative state, as it existed in the 1930s and as it presently exists,
violate this constitutional separation of powers and due process tradition, as
we will explain in more detail in Parts II and III.  Metzger wisely does not
attempt to ground the legality of modern institutions in the original meaning
of the constitutional text.  That cannot be done.  Nor is there an authorita-
tive text from the 1930s on this topic which today binds legal actors who
profess fidelity to the Constitution.
Lacking a text from which to work, Metzger implicitly appeals to the
zeitgeist of the 1930s, which she seems to believe was what Bruce Ackerman
has called a “constitutional moment”38 that can displace the actual Constitu-
tion as the primary object of interpretation.  We do not doubt that Metzger
has correctly identified the original meaning of the general thrust of legal
and political elite opinion in the 1930s which gave rise to modern govern-
ment, with its dislike of representative control of government and its prefer-
ence for “expert” decisionmaking.  She has accurately ascertained the
original intentions of James Landis’s The Administrative Process.39 We do,
however, doubt whether that original meaning is a better guide to govern-
ance than is the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution.  Even if one does
not much like the U.S. Constitution (and James Landis’s dislike of the instru-
ment shines forth from every page of his 1938 book), replacing it with the
zeitgeist of the 1930s is a dreadfully bad idea.
The period from 1930–1939 was clearly the worst decade of the last 100
years and is one of the worst decades in the history of mankind.  It began
with the Great Depression and it ended with the start of World War II.  In
between, Americans saw the proliferation of just about every vile form of gov-
ernment that has plagued the planet over the past century.  There were
broad intellectual currents that underlaid—even if they did not determine or
make inevitable—the horrific events of that decade.  To the extent that
aspects of the American state partook of these global intellectual currents—
and that extent is larger than many people today are comfortable acknowl-
edging or even entertaining as a hypothesis—it was a terrible development.
The decade was bad from the start.  In 1933, Germany elected a parlia-
ment, which chose National Socialist German Workers’ Party, or “Nazi” Party,
leader Adolf Hitler to be the Chancellor of Germany.40  On March 24, 1933,
the German parliament delegated all of its legislative powers to Hitler and his
National Socialist German Workers’ Party Cabinet in the Enabling Act of
1933.41  Articles I and II of the Enabling Act provided:
38 See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 16, at 34–57.
39 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
40 We recognize that any mention of German national socialism in the 1930s is likely
to raise hackles.  But discussing the currents of the 1930s without reference to German
national socialism is like discussing the Civil War without reference to slavery.  Avoiding
discussion of Nazism in this context is intellectually irresponsible.
41 Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich, v. 24.3.1933 (RGBl. I S.141).  For
a discussion of how a lack of restraint on legislative delegation in Germany provided a
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Article 1: In addition to the procedure prescribed by the constitution, laws
of the Reich may also be enacted by the government of the Reich.  This
includes the laws referred to by Articles 85 Paragraph 2 and Article 87 of the
constitution.
Article 2: Laws enacted by the government of the Reich may deviate from
the constitution as long as they do not affect the institutions of the Reichstag
and the Reichsrat.  The rights of the President remain undisturbed.42
When the President of Germany, Paul von Hindenburg, died in August
1934, Hitler used his delegated powers to declare himself to be the Fu¨hrer of
the Third Reich, and liberal constitutional democracy in Germany came to
an end.
One of the first things Hitler did when he came to power in March 1933
was to pass a German-style eugenics law, modeled on the many then-existing
American state eugenics laws,43 which provided for the compulsory steriliza-
tion of those deemed to have a “mental deficiency” so they would not pollute
the gene pool of the Third Reich.44  In the United States, six years earlier,
the Supreme Court had, quite wrongly, in Buck v. Bell45 upheld the constitu-
tionality of compulsory sterilization in an eight to one decision, with the
majority opinion written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Holmes infa-
mously wrote: “The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.  Three generations of imbeciles
are enough.”46  Sixty thousand Americans were compulsorily sterilized until
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson47 helped put an end to the practice in
the 1940s.48  Twenty thousand of those people were sterilized in the 1930s—
more than three times as many as had been sterilized in the 1920s.49
prior legal grounding for the Enabling Act, see Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamen-
tary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s–1950s,
113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1364–71 (2004).
42 Text of the Enabling Act 1933, HIST. LEARNING SITE, http://www.historylearningsite.
co.uk/nazi-germany/text-of-the-enabling-act-1933/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).  Articles 85
and 87 of the Weimar Constitution dealt with budgetary laws.
43 In 1933, twenty-seven states had sterilization laws. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECK-
LESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 20
(2008).  By 1935, only a dozen states did not have eugenics laws in force or pending. See id.
at 20–22.
44 See 5 OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI
CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 880–83 (1946).
45 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
46 Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
47 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
48 For a compelling account of Skinner and the events that led to it, see NOURSE, supra
note 43, at 13–16.  The figure of 60,000 may be low, as accurate data on forced steriliza-
tions in this country was not always available. See EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK:
EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE, at xvi (2003).
49 See THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS & AMERICAN ECO-
NOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 117 (2016); see also NOURSE, supra note 43, at 31, 211 n.23.
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The German Reich’s eugenics law resulted from “a sustained engage-
ment with America’s eugenics movement,”50 and the “Nazis even looked to
the United States as a ‘model.’”51  Yale Law School Professor James Q. Whit-
man writes compellingly about America’s romance with eugenics and its
influence on Germany in his book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States
and the Making of Nazi Race Law.52  Investigative journalist Edwin Black has
produced a comprehensive intellectual and political history of American
eugenics.53   Princeton Professor Thomas Leonard has also trenchantly writ-
ten about the pervasiveness of eugenics-based ideas in the United States in
the New Deal and pre–New Deal era.54  Eugenics dominated the intellectual
landscape for decades up to and through the 1930s to a degree that is hard
to fathom in modern times,55 finding enthusiastic support from influential
people such as Theodore Roosevelt56 and Margaret Sanger.57
Two related principles drove the worldwide push to eugenics.  One prin-
ciple was the idea of caste: some people, and some whole classes of people
denominated races,58 were considered to be categorically inferior to
others.59  The point of eugenics was to prevent the “bad” races from breed-
ing or intermixing with the “better” races to avoid contamination of the gene
pool.  Eugenics represented a profound, widespread, and intellectually preva-
lent rejection of the basic principle of human equality.  Professor Victoria
Nourse eloquently summarizes the dominant ethos of eugenics in the first
third of the twentieth century:
It was not only the openly racist Aryan-lovers who wrote of the “iron law of
inequality” and touted racist aristocracy.  Eugenic pioneers such as Charles
Davenport had written that all men were “bound by their protoplasmic
makeup and unequal in their powers and responsibilities.”  Geneticists like
Harvard’s Edward M. East wrote that equality was a fraud: the “cult of e´ga-
lite´ . . . is a pose.”  Henry Fairfield Osborn, the president of the American
50 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAK-
ING OF NAZI RACE LAW 8 (2017).
51 Id. (quoting STEFAN KU¨HL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND
GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM, at xii (1994)); see also HARRY BRUINIUS, BETTER FOR ALL THE
WORLD: THE SECRET HISTORY OF FORCED STERILIZATION AND AMERICA’S QUEST FOR RACIAL
PURITY 283–86 (2006) (describing American influence on German eugenics).
52 WHITMAN, supra note 50.
53 BLACK, supra note 48.
54 LEONARD, supra note 49; see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84–132 (2018).
55 See id. at 110 (“In the first three decades of the twentieth century, eugenic ideas
were politically influential, culturally fashionable, and scientifically mainstream.”).
56 See BLACK, supra note 48, at 46, 99.
57 Id. at 127–44.
58 The idea of a “race” at that time extended far more broadly than does the modern
use of that term.  Aryans, Irish, Italians, and Jews, among numerous others, were all consid-
ered “races.” See NOURSE, supra note 43, at 35–36, 170. Indeed, there were fine-grained
theories of race that, for example, broke down Jews into discrete categories based on coun-
tries of origin. See BLACK, supra note 48, at 190.
59 See LEONARD, supra note 49, at 111; NOURSE, supra note 43, at 15.
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Museum of Natural History, publicly derided the claim that all men were
created equal as “political sophistry.”  The eugenics popularizer Albert Wig-
gam insisted that men were “irremediably and ineradicably unequal.”  The
zoologist S.J. Holmes summed it all up: “If there is any one thing which has
been thrown absolutely out of court by the advances of biology and psychol-
ogy, it is the dogma of the natural equality of man.”60
The second, and related, principle underlying the fascination with
eugenics was that the basic unit of value was a collective: the nation, the race,
or the tribe.  Individuals were simply cells in an organic whole rather than
ends in themselves.61  Reproduction was not a choice that could be left to
individuals.  Reproductive capacity, as with all other kinds of human capacity,
was seen as a social resource to be deployed or not by the collective for collec-
tive purposes.  These ideas permeated intellectual life in the 1930s.  Eugenics
was simply a concrete manifestation of these deeper ideas about people, their
relationship to others, and their relationship to government.  Some people
are fit to reproduce and/or govern; others are just fit to be sterilized and/or
governed.  The profound antiegalitarianism that underlies eugenics suggests,
if it does not strictly entail, a model of governance that places as much power
as possible in the hands of those deemed (generally by themselves and their
peers) fit to exercise it.  The same disbelief in human equality and democ-
racy which grounded the eugenics laws grounded ideas about government,
which was to be run by “experts” who would make the trains run on time.
Ordinary people simply could not handle the complexities of modern life, so
they needed to be managed by their betters.  All for the greater good, of
course.
The 1930s was not just a decade that saw the triumph of Hitler, national
socialism, and eugenics laws.  It was also a decade of fascism both in Italy and
in the United States.62  Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini during the
1930s took over all of Italian industry in a program that was then emulated by
60 NOURSE, supra note 43, at 83.
61 See id. at 125.  On the widespread endorsement of the organic theory of the state in
this era, see LEONARD, supra note 49, at 101–07.
62 We use the word “fascism” in its descriptive political-economic sense, rooted in early
twentieth-century Italian politics from which the word comes, rather than (as it is often
employed) as a vague epithet to describe anything that one does not like.  Perhaps the
most detailed definition of fascism, which we do not agree with in every particular but
which captures the key elements of the ideology, was provided by John Flynn in the midst
of World War II:
[Fascism] includes these devices:
1. A government whose powers are unrestrained.
2. A leader who is a dictator, absolute in power but responsible to the party
which is a preferred elite.
3. An economic system in which production and distribution are carried on
by private owners but in accordance with plans made by the state directly or
under its immediate supervision.
4. These plans involve control of all the instruments of production and distri-
bution through great government bureaus which have the power to make regula-
tions or directives with the force of law.
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FDR in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933,63 the legislative
centerpiece of FDR’s first one hundred days, in which Congress effectively
subdelegated its legislative power to FDR and his Cabinet.  Under the NIRA,
all industries were to be governed by a criminally enforceable code of con-
duct drawn up by committees of corporate managers and labor union chiefs
and then approved or promulgated by FDR himself.  Sections 2 and 3 of the
NIRA provided:
SEC. 2. (a) To effectuate the policy of this title, the President is hereby
authorized to establish such agencies, to accept and utilize such voluntary
and uncompensated services, to appoint, without regard to the provisions of
the civil service laws, such officers and employees, and to utilize such Federal
officers and employees, and, with the consent of the State, such State and
local officers and employees, as he may find necessary, to prescribe their
authorities, duties, responsibilities, and tenure, and, without regard to the
Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to fix the compensation of any
officers and employees so appointed.
(b) The President may delegate any of his functions and powers under
this title to such officers, agents, and employees as he may designate or
appoint . . . .
. . . .
SEC. 3. (a) Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code or codes
of fair competition for the trade or industry or sub-division thereof, repre-
sented by the applicant or applicants, if the President finds (1) that such
associations or groups impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to
membership therein and are truly representative of such trades or industries
or subdivisions thereof, and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to
5. They involve also the comprehensive integration of government and pri-
vate finances, under which investment is directed and regimented by the govern-
ment, so that while ownership is private and production is carried on by private
owners there is a type of socialization of investment, of the financial aspects of
production. . . .
6. They involve also the device of creating streams of purchasing power by
federal government borrowing and spending as a permanent institution.
7. As a necessary consequence of all this, militarism becomes an inevitable
part of the system since it provides the easiest means of draining great numbers
annually from the labor market and of creating a tremendous industry for the
production of arms for defense, which industry is supported wholly by govern-
ment borrowing and spending.
8. Imperialism becomes an essential element of such a system where that is
possible—particularly in the strong states, since the whole fascist system, despite
its promises of abundance, necessitates great financial and personal sacrifices,
which people cannot be induced to make in the interest of the ordinary objec-
tives of civil life and which they will submit to only when they are presented with
some national crusade or adventure on the heroic model touching deeply the
springs of chauvinistic pride, interest, and feeling.
JOHN T. FLYNN, AS WE GO MARCHING 160–62 (1944).
63 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will
not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the
policy of this title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not permit
monopolies or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That where such
code or codes affect the services and welfare of persons engaged in other
steps of the economic process, nothing in this section shall deprive such
persons of the right to be heard prior to approval by the President of such
code or codes.  The President may, as a condition of his approval of any such
code, impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of
reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers, com-
petitors, employees, and others, and in furtherance of the public interest,
and may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of
such code, as the President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate
the policy herein declared.
(b) After the President shall have approved any such code, the provi-
sions of such code shall be the standards of fair competition for such trade
or industry or subdivision thereof.  Any violation of such standards in any
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be deemed
an unfair method of competition in commerce within the meaning of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended . . . .
. . . .
(d) Upon his own motion, or if complaint is made to the President that
abuses inimical to the public interest and contrary to the policy herein
declared are prevalent in any trade or industry or subdivision thereof, and if
no code of fair competition therefor has theretofore been approved by the
President, the President, after such public notice and hearing as he shall
specify, may prescribe and approve a code of fair competition for such trade
or industry or subdivision thereof, which shall have the same effect as a code
of fair competition approved by the President under subsection (a) of this
section. . . .
. . . .
(f) When a code of fair competition has been approved or prescribed by
the President under this title, any violation of any provision thereof in any
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be a misde-
meanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be fined not more
than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation continues shall be
deemed a separate offense.64
“There was hardly a commentator who failed to see elements of Italian
corporatism in Roosevelt’s managed economy under the National Recovery
Administration . . . .”65  The original director of the NIRA, among other early
New Dealers, was an open admirer of both Mussolini—or, as President
Roosevelt called him, “that admirable Italian gentleman”66—and the Italian
governance model.67  “Mussolini’s own response to this aspect of the NIRA
64 Id. §§ 2–3.
65 WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THREE NEW DEALS 23 (2006).
66 Id. at 31.
67 See James Q. Whitman, Of Corporativism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 747, 747–48 (1991).
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scheme was ‘Ecco un ditatore!’—‘Behold a dictator!’”68  The Nazis were sim-
ilarly admiring of the dictatorial aspects of the New Deal.69
The NIRA was challenged on constitutional grounds as being, among
other things, an unconstitutional subdelegation of legislative power.70  The
Supreme Court unanimously agreed with this challenge in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States.71  We must emphasize that liberal Supreme
Court Justices Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Harlan Fiske Stone all
agreed that the New Deal Congress’s and FDR’s fascist72 law was an unconsti-
tutional subdelegation of power.  If we are to look at all at the 1930s for
guidance, it is to the unanimous opinion in Schechter Poultry and its full-
throated rejection of uncontrolled subdelegations of legislative power that
we should look, rather than to the later-sustained subdelegations that weak-
ened the liberty-preserving separation of powers.73
Farther to the east, communism had fully taken root in the Soviet Union
in the 1930s under the leadership of Joseph Stalin.  We will never know for
sure how many people died, and how many more had their lives ruined
beyond repair, by communist oppression in the 1930s, but the number has to
be in the millions, and possibly in the tens of millions.  At their time, “Stalin’s
massacres were probably the worst in history.”74
Thus, the 1930s was the worldwide heyday of the political ideologies of
national socialism (Germany), fascism (Italy and the United States), and
communism (the Soviet Union).75
In America, aside from taking Mussolini as a model, and the resulting
grinding poverty of the 1930s,76 in the South it was yet another decade of Jim
68 Id. at 766.
69 See SCHIVELBUSCH, supra note 65, at 18 (“The National Socialists hailed the emer-
gency relief measures undertaken during Roosevelt’s first hundred days in office as fully
consistent with their own revolutionary program.  On May 11, 1933, the main Nazi newspa-
per, the Vo¨lkischer Beobachter, offered its commentary in an article with the headline
‘Roosevelt’s Dictatorial Recovery Measures.’”); WHITMAN, supra note 50, at 6 (“We have
long known the strange fact that the Nazis frequently praised Franklin Roosevelt and New
Deal government in the early 1930s.  FDR received distinctly favorable treatment in the
Nazi press until at least 1936 or 1937, lauded as a man who had seized ‘dictatorial powers’
and embarked upon ‘bold experiments’ in the spirit of the Fu¨hrer.”).
70 See, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
71 Id.
72 Again, we use the term in its descriptive political-economic sense, not as an unde-
fined epithet.
73 The similarities between American and German subdelegations of legislative power
in the 1930s are noted in SCHIVELBUSCH, supra note 65, at 18.
74 BRIAN CROZIER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE 43 (1999).  Mao Zedong
claimed the top spot in body count from Stalin several decades later. See id.
75 Professor Lawson adds that the 1930s saw the triumph of positivism in philosophy,
the rise of Keynesianism in economics, and the ascendance of antiformalism in jurispru-
dence.  He considers all of these developments wrong, pernicious, or both.
76 At least one economic model suggests that the New Deal might have prolonged the
Great Depression by as much as seven years. See Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New
Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL.
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Crow segregation.  FDR’s New Deal coalition was a union of ethnic groups in
the Northeast and Midwest and southern segregationists in the South.77
Many members of FDR’s cabinet and administrative team were southern seg-
regationists.  It was not until the end of the 1940s, when President Harry
Truman desegregated the armed services of the United States, that Jim Crow
as administrative policy began to be questioned.78
We emphasize to tedium and beyond that the point of this historical
excursion is not to argue that the American administrative state of the 1930s
incorporated or represented all of the evils of its time.  America, administra-
tive state and all, remained in the 1930s, as it had been for quite some time
and continues to be today, the world’s shining city on a hill.  There was no
Federal Department of Eugenics (that was all done at the state level),79 and
Americans devoted blood and treasure to combatting some of the worst ele-
ments of one of humanity’s worst decades.  The point is simply that the 1930s
is a presumptively awful decade from which to seek guidance today, in 2018.
The intellectual currents of that time, even in this country, were terrible.
America survived the 1930s, but to see that decade as something of a second
founding—much less as something that supersedes the real founding—is
utterly perverse.  We cannot begin to understand those who find something
appealing about the 1930s.
But weren’t there ideas, themes, and institutions from the 1930s that
most Americans today would find appealing?  Of course there were.  Other-
wise, we would not have the government that we do, and we would probably
not be writing this Article.  That is not the point.  All that we are trying to
demonstrate is that it is not self-evident that “We did that in the 1930s”
trumps “We did that in the Constitution.”  One should not let a halo effect
from some favored institutions shield everything that emerged from a very
dark period in human history.
ECON. 779, 813 (2004).  We are in no position to evaluate this model, but its conclusions
conform to our amateur intuitions about the likely consequences of New Deal economic
interventions.
77 See WHITMAN, supra note 50, at 7.  To be sure, the story is more complicated than
this simple observation.  Nonetheless, in 1932, the Democrats made major gains in the
Midwest, and in 1936 they added, inter alia, gains in significant portions of the Northeast.
See David Darmofal, The Political Geography of the New Deal Realignment, 36 AM. POL. RES. 934,
940–43 (2008).  Democrat vote margins in the South were overwhelming in both 1932 and
1936. See 1932, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elec-
tions/1932 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018); 1936, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elections/1936 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
78 Desegregation of the Armed Forces, HARRY S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM,
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/index
.php?action=BG (last updated 2017).
79 Federal involvement in eugenics was indirect, mostly involving the Department of
Agriculture. See BLACK, supra note 48, at 47, 71–72, 97.
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To try one final time to reduce the possibility of any misunderstanding
of our point80: we are not saying that everything from a bad time is bad and
everything from a good time is good.  Good ideas can emerge from bad times
and bad ideas can emerge from good times.  Nor are we making a ludicrous
ad hominem argument to the effect that all New Dealers were or are Nazi
eugenicists or that every single idea that emerged from that decade is
tainted.81  It is quite possible to think that, for example, Social Security is a
good idea without also thinking that Mussolini was an “admirable Italian gen-
tleman.”82  Professor Wolfgang Schivelbusch explains:
[T]o compare is not the same as to equate.  America during Roosevelt’s New
Deal did not become a one-party state; it had no secret police, the Constitu-
tion remained in force, and there were no concentration camps; the New
Deal preserved the institutions of the liberal-democratic system that National
Socialism abolished.83
And as John Flynn eloquently put it in 1944, the American variant of fascism
“will be a very genteel and dainty and pleasant form of fascism which cannot
be called fascism at all because it will be so virtuous and polite.”84
Our point, rather, goes to the ground for constitutional reasoning.
Because there is no authoritative constitutional text emanating from the
1930s, any reasons for treating that decade as interpretatively sacrosanct must
focus on the moral goodness of the ideas that grounded that period.  Many
of the intellectual currents that dominated the 1930s were, frankly, very bad.
As a starting point for thinking about human affairs, one’s first instinct
should be to run as far away from that decade as quickly as one can.  More
fundamentally, the bad ideas of the 1930s that specifically drove the construc-
tion of certain parts of the modern administrative state—belief in omnipo-
tent government by socially superior experts under broad subdelegations of
legislative power, with a formal (or rote) separation of powers seen as an
anachronistic hindrance to modern scientific management of people, who
are not ends in themselves but simply means to the accomplishment of col-
lective nationalist or tribalist ends—are at the intellectual core of just about
everything bad that occurred during that decade.  Perhaps, when all is said
and done, one might conclude that, all things considered, even those fea-
tures of the modern administrative state are best preserved.  But if one
reaches that conclusion, one should do so grudgingly, with full acknowledg-
ment of its significance, and with the aim of minimizing rather than maximiz-
ing the impact of that decision on fundamental provisions of the
80 We can only try to reduce, not eliminate, the possibility of misunderstanding.  Intel-
lectually dishonest or lazy people are capable of misunderstanding anything.
81 We leave ad hominems to others. Cf., e.g., Metzger, supra note 4, at 65 (“Accounts
of the Tea Party . . . identify the close interweaving of economic conservatism and racial
and ethnic resentment in the group’s anti-administrative views.”).
82 SCHIVELBUSCH, supra note 65, at 31.
83 Id. at 11; see also FLYNN, supra note 62, at 170 (making the same point).
84 FLYNN, supra note 62, at 255.
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Constitution.  Those features are nothing to celebrate, even if they turn out
to be something to tolerate.
The specific features of the administrative state that we address in Parts
II and III of this Article—and we emphasize that we are addressing in this
Article specific features and not the entirety of the modern state apparatus—
are not a shining beacon through the dark times of the 1930s.  They are an
instantiation of some of the worst ideas of that time, even if their implemen-
tation in this country was, and continues to be, “virtuous and polite.”85  And
if one is bound and determined to look to times rather than texts as grounds
for constitutional interpretation (and, again, we prefer texts to times), we
have a much better candidate for a decade to which one can look for sound
guidance about human affairs.  That decade did not yield the administrative
state.  It yielded the U.S. Constitution.
B. The Time of the Constitution
The 1780s was one of the most important and best decades of the last
250 years.  It started with Americans winning their independence at the Bat-
tle of Yorktown, and the decade ended with a relatively peaceful (by the stan-
dards of revolutions) French Revolution, which aspired to bring American
constitutional democracy and the end of feudalism to France.  The 1780s
were the culmination of the Age of the Enlightenment—a period during
which feudalism was rejected, the Constitution was written, and the North-
west Ordinance banning slavery in all of the then-federal territories was
passed.86  Influential people of that time believed, in the words of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution of 1780, that “[a]ll men are born free and equal, and
have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and
obtaining their safety and happiness.”87
The vicious ideologies that dominated the 1930s had not yet taken wide
hold, and prominent intellectuals (at least in western Europe and North
America) widely agreed that men were “born free and equal,”88 thus putting
85 Id.
86 An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest
of the River Ohio art. VI (1787) (“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted.”).  To be sure, the Ordinance also included a precursor to the
Fugitive Slave Clause: “Provided, always, that any person escaping into the same, from
whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original states, such fugitive may
be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as
aforesaid.” Id.
87 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. I.
88 Needless to say (or, rather, it should be needless to say but is unfortunately needful
to say), to be “born free and equal” refers to formal equality under the law.  It does not
speak to equality of circumstances, equality of wealth, equality of satisfaction, equality of
height, equality of facial hair, or equality of anything other than the basic—dare we say
natural?—rights of persons.  That people are born free and equal means simply that no
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an end to feudalism under which aristocrats and commoners were funda-
mentally unequal.  The language quoted above from the Massachusetts Con-
stitution of 1780 appears in some form in seven of the fourteen state
constitutions in place in 1791 when the federal Bill of Rights, with its Ninth
Amendment, was ratified; and fifty-nine percent of all Americans then living
lived in states with “born free and equal” clauses.89  By 1868, when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified, twenty-seven out of thirty-nine states had
“born free and equal” clauses in their state constitutions, and today thirty-
nine of the fifty state constitutions have such clauses.90  The “born free and
equal” clause language is also the language that Thomas Jefferson artfully
employed in the Declaration of Independence in which he wrote that: “We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”91
The “born free and equal” idea was overwhelmingly dominant in intel-
lectual circles in the 1780s both in France and in the United States.  It is
evident in the first articles of the French Revolutionary Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen, which said that:
1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.  Social distinctions may
be founded only upon the general good.
2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man.  These rights are liberty, property, security,
and resistance to oppression. . . .
. . . .
4. Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else;
hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except
those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the
same rights.  These limits can only be determined by law.
5. Law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society.  Nothing may
be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do
anything not provided for by law.92
This Declaration of Rights was written and introduced in the French
National Assembly by the Marquis de Lafayette, who had served in the Ameri-
can Revolution under George Washington, with whom he became a close
one has a right to rule over others by virtue of birth, caste, or having received the “correct”
degrees from the “correct” institutions of higher learning.
89 Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787
and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1522–23 (2012).
90 Steven Gow Calabresi, James Lindgren, Hannah M. Begley, Kathryn L. Dore &
Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in a
Modern-Day Consensus of the States?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 49, 127 (2018).
91 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
92 De´claration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen [Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen], arts. 1–2, 4–5 (Fr. 1789).
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friend.93  Lafayette had read the many American state bills of rights, which
had “born free and equal” clauses in them.94
The main political events of the 1780s were the writing and ratification
of the U.S. Constitution, the writing of the Federalist Papers to persuade Amer-
icans to ratify the Constitution, the writing of the Northwest Ordinance ban-
ning slavery in federal territories, and the French Revolution, which initially
replaced absolute monarchy with a constitutional monarch and a unicameral
legislature called the National Assembly.  While the French Revolution even-
tually degenerated into a Reign of Terror and a Napoleonic liberal dictator-
ship, these deplorable events occurred in the 1790s and not in the 1780s.
The zeitgeist of the 1780s is captured by the “born free and equal” clauses,
with their libertarian and egalitarian commitments to replace European feu-
dalism with something new and better.
Of course, the 1780s yielded its own parade of horribles, as the intellec-
tual idea of “born free and equal” was, as a practical matter, dishonored in
the breach.  In the United States, the moral abomination of African-Ameri-
can slavery was still in place, at least partially ratified by the U.S. Constitution,
which permitted the slave trade for two decades,95 extended the legal effect
of slavery to states that did not recognize it as a matter of positive law,96 and
allowed slave states partially to count slaves for purposes of representation in
Congress and the electoral college.97  Native Americans were being grossly
mistreated in a fashion to which the word “genocide” is uncomfortably apt;
Hitler was very admiring of the Americans’ brutal treatment of the native
population.98  Worldwide, women were not accorded full status as persons.
In France, the kidnapping of King Louis XVI and his forced return from
Versailles to Paris in October 1789 foreshadowed dangers to come.  We do
not claim that the 1780s were anything remotely resembling a paradise or
that the “born free and equal” ideal was actually implemented.99  We are
saying only that the broad intellectual trends in that decade, and the political
movements and institutional developments generated by those trends, were
largely in the right direction.  On December 31, 1789, King Louis XVI’s
problems were only a storm cloud on the horizon, and, in the United States,
a great many intellectuals agreed that slavery was immoral and that it should
be abolished.  The states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and (later) Ver-
mont all abolished slavery.  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was passed by
the Continental Congress, and it abolished slavery in the land that would
93 See Mary Stockwell, Marquis de Lafayette, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/mar
quis-de-lafayette/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
94 Id.
95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. V.
96 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
97 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
98 See WHITMAN, supra note 50, at 9.
99 See HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 369 (“Prior to the Civil War, although the theory
was one of consent, the reality was that elites often excluded much of the people from
being represented.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 23 27-DEC-18 9:22
2018] the  depravity  of  the  1930s 843
become the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Min-
nesota.  Certainly this was not nearly enough, but it was more than human
experience to that point gave much hope of expecting; slavery has been a
stain on human civilization for most of recorded history.  In the 1780s, how-
ever, there were glimmers that slavery might be on the way out in America,
and it was not until the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney in 1793
that American slavery got a new lease on life.
One of the core intellectual ideas of the 1780s was a belief in the impor-
tance of the separation of powers, as it was described by the French political
philosopher Montesquieu in his treatise entitled The Spirit of the Laws.100
Montesquieu argued for a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers because he believed, as Lord Acton would later say, that “[p]ower
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”101  All of the
American state constitutions in the 1780s provided for a separation of pow-
ers, and the Federal Constitution of 1788 does so as well.
American constitutionalism instantiates a system of checks and balances,
as James Madison famously highlighted in The Federalist Nos. 47 to 51.102
Thus, the American Constitution gives the President a share of the legislative
power by giving him the veto power;103 and it gives the Senate a share of the
executive power by giving the Senate the power to confirm presidential
nominations and to ratify presidentially negotiated treaties.104  Madison
defended his system of checks and balances in the following famous excerpt
from The Federalist No. 51, which bears constant repetition in modern times:
To what expedient then shall we finally resort, for maintaining in prac-
tice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid
down in the constitution?  The only answer that can be given is, that as all
these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be
supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that
its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places. . . .
. . . .
It is . . . evident, that the members of each department should be as
little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments
annexed to their offices.  Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not
independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in
every other, would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer
each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives,
to resist encroachments of the others.  The provision for defence must in
this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.
100 See generally 1–2 CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE COM-
PLETE WORKS OF M. DE MONTESQUIEU (1777).
101 Letter from Acton to Creighton, supra note 13.
102 See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–51 (James Madison).
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3.
104 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.  The interest of the man,
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.  It may be a
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to con-
trol the abuses of government.  But what is government itself, but the great-
est of all reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no government
would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary.  In framing a govern-
ment, which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies
in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place, oblige it to control itself.  A dependence on the people is,
no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs,
private as well as public.  We see it particularly displayed in all the
subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is, to divide and
arrange the several offices in such a manner, as that each may be a check on
the other; that the private interest of every individual, may be a centinel over
the public rights.  These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in
the distribution of the supreme powers of the state.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-
defence.  In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily pre-
dominates.  The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature
into different branches; and to render them by different modes of election,
and different principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the
nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the
society will admit.105
This governmental framework106 brilliantly accommodates the claims of
representative democracy with a realistic vision of human nature.  The repub-
lican institutions of the Constitution are designed to mediate the need for
popular control of government and the dangers of factions that spring from
the variety of human interests, as the two of us discussed a quarter-century
ago.107  To call this scheme a work of genius does not begin to communicate
its importance for human flourishing.  It creates a structure to focus and
channel popular control of government without putting a caste of creden-
105 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 397–99 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1866).
106 We emphasize, because the point is far too often overlooked, that this framework is
formal.  While that formal framework has functional consequences, such as a system of
checks and balances, those consequences do not have independent constitutional status.
One does not adhere to the Constitution by drawing up alternative institutions that one
thinks (even correctly) will have similar, or even superior, functional consequences.  One
can, of course, prefer and propose alternative institutions to the Constitution, but it is hard
to see the intellectual justification for calling those alternative structures “the
Constitution.”
107 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Foreword: Two Visions of the Nature of Man, 16
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1993).
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tialed mandarins in charge of people’s lives.108  Importantly, the intricate
scheme of the Constitution makes it more likely that important decisions will
be grounded on a nationwide, rather than a regional or class-based, consen-
sus.  Technocrats have to convince other people, and not just each other,
that their ideas are good before they become law.
Unlike the 1930s, the 1780s is a very good place in which to find norma-
tively appealing ideas—and by that we mean ideas which, over the long term
and in the large run of cases are likely, if consistently pursued, to promote a
wide degree of human flourishing—from which to ground theories of gov-
ernment.  The zeitgeist of the 1780s was the “born free and equal” clauses
and a political commitment to separation of powers, while the zeitgeist of the
1930s was filled with antiequality eugenicists, totalitarianism, and rule by self-
identified credentialed experts.  These two decades of human history could
not be more different.
One very important part of the Constitution, of course, did not emerge
during the 1780s but was added eight decades later.  We thus take a brief
detour into one other time period that is crucial for understanding the origi-
nal meaning of the present-day Constitution.
C. “Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory”: The Zeitgeist of the 1860s
The 1860s in the United States—or at least in parts of the United
States—were much more like the 1780s than they were like the 1930s.
Twenty-four out of thirty-seven states in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, had a “born free and equal” clause in their state constitu-
tional bills of rights.109  The big event of the decade was the American Civil
War and the long-overdue abolition of African-American slavery through the
adoption in 1865 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Ideologically, the Civil War was fought over the issue of whether the
“born free and equal” clause idea applied to African Americans.110  The Vice
President of the Confederate States, Alexander Stephens, in his infamous
Cornerstone Speech given in March 1861, directly and openly challenged the
“born free and equal” idea in the following language:
The prevailing ideas entertained by [Thomas Jefferson] and most of the
leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were
that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature;
108 We thus agree with the conclusions, even if we do not agree with all of the method-
ology, of JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTI-
TUTION (2013).
109 ARNOLD T. GUMINSKI, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 173 (2009).
110 Yes, we are aware that President Lincoln’s rationale for the Civil War was as much or
more nationalist as it was antislavery.  We are not historians, but we simply do not believe
that most Americans who fought for the North were motivated by unadulterated national-
ism rather than antislavery sentiments.  We do not believe that “The Battle Hymn of the
Republic” was a paean to a fixed set of borders in an atlas.  If we are historically wrong
about that, we stand corrected.
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that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically.  It was an evil
they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of
that day was that, somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institu-
tion would be evanescent and pass away.  This idea, though not incorporated
in the constitution, was the prevailing idea at that time.  The constitution, it
is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should
last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the constitutional
guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day.
Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong.  They rested upon the
assumption of the equality of races.  This was an error.  It was a sandy foun-
dation, and the government built upon it fell when the “storm came and the
wind blew.”
Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its
foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the
negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the supe-
rior race—is his natural and normal condition.
This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based
upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth.  This truth has
been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the vari-
ous departments of science.  It has been so even amongst us.  Many who hear
me, perhaps, can recollect well, that this truth was not generally admitted,
even within their day.  The errors of the past generation still clung to many
as late as twenty years ago.  Those at the North, who still cling to these
errors, with a zeal above knowledge, we justly denominate fanatics.  All fanat-
icism springs from an aberration of the mind—from a defect in reasoning.
It is a species of insanity.  One of the most striking characteristics of insanity,
in many instances, is forming correct conclusions from fancied or erroneous
premises; so with the anti-slavery fanatics; their conclusions are right if their
premises were.  They assume that the negro is equal, and hence conclude
that he is entitled to equal privileges and rights with the white man.  If their
premises were correct, their conclusions would be logical and just—but their
premise being wrong, their whole argument fails.111
Abraham Lincoln responded to Alexander Stephens in the Gettysburg
Address:
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a
new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any
nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. . . .
[W]e here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that
this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that govern-
111 Alexander H. Stephens, Vice President of the Confederacy, The Corner Stone
Speech (Mar. 21, 1861), in HENRY CLEVELAND, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS IN PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE: WITH LETTERS AND SPEECHES BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE WAR 717, 721–22
(1866).
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ment of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the
earth.112
It is for this reason that, after the South lost the Civil War and the slaves
were freed, the South still tried again in 1865 to legislate what were called
“Black Codes,” imposing second-class citizenship on African Americans.113
Congress outlawed such codes, and all other systems of caste, in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.114  The Fourteenth Amendment provided a clear consti-
tutional foundation for this legislation in 1868—and, we would argue if we
had the space here, invalidated many of those state laws of its own force.  The
Fourteenth Amendment forbade not only the Black Codes, but also Euro-
pean feudalism and the traditional Hindu caste system.115  The Fourteenth
Amendment made the “born free and equal” idea the supreme law of the
land.
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, a key figure in the writing of
the Fourteenth Amendment, responded to Alexander Stephens as follows:
The Rebellion began in two assumptions, . . . first, the sovereignty of the
States, with the pretended right of secession; and, secondly, the superiority
of the white race, with the pretended right of Caste, Oligarchy, and Monop-
oly, on account of color. . . . The second showed itself at the beginning,
when South Carolina alone, among the thirteen States allowed her Constitu-
tion to be degraded by an exclusion on account of color . . . .116
In fact, for Sumner, slavery was a system of caste:
A Caste cannot exist except in defiance of the first principles of Christianity
and the first principles of a Republic.  It is Heathenism in religion and tyr-
anny in government.  The Brahmins and the Sudras in India, from genera-
tion to generation, have been separated, as the two races are now separated
in these States.  If a Sudra presumed to sit on a Brahmin’s carpet he was
punished with banishment.  But our recent rebels undertake to play the part
of the Bramhins, and exclude citizens, with better title than themselves, from
essential rights, simply on the ground of Caste, which, according to its Portu-
guese origin, casta, is only another term for race.117
Sumner went as far as to propose legislation banning all systems of caste,
class, and monopoly in the Senate in 1866.  The language he used for the
proposed statute was extremely broad:
There shall be no Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste, or Monopoly invested with
peculiar privileges and powers, and there shall be no denial of rights, civil or
political, on account of color or race anywhere within the limits of the
112 Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
113 See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why
the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 924 (2013).
114 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981–1982 (2012)).
115 See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 113, at 934–61.
116 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 686 (1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
117 Id. at 683.
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United States or the jurisdiction thereof; but all persons therein shall be
equal before the law. . . .118
Representative Norton Townshend, a Democrat from Ohio, spoke out
against slavery in the following terms on the House floor:
I protest against all these interpolations into the Democratic creed, and
against any such interpretation of Democracy as makes it the ally of slavery
and oppression.  Democracy and slavery are directly antagonistic.  Democ-
racy is opposed to caste, slavery creates it; Democracy is opposed to special
privileges; slavery is but the privilege specially enjoyed by one class to use
another as brute beasts and take their labor without wages; Democracy is for
elevating the laboring masses to the dignity of perfect manhood; slavery
grinds the laborer into the very dust. . . . [S]lavery is but the extreme of class
legislation. . . . [S]lavery is nothing more than the privilege some have of
living out of others . . . .119
Another representative, associated at times with the Democratic Party but
who allied himself with the Radical Republicans, John F. Farnsworth, said:
As a moral being, as a man, I hate slavery in the States of this Union as I hate
serfdom in Russia—which, by the way, is about to be abolished in that
Empire, while we are quarrelling over the extension of slavery in this—just as
I hate caste in India; just as I hate oppression everywhere.120
The bottom line is that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized
the “born free and equal” idea of the Declaration of Independence and of
the Gettysburg Address, and it rejected as false Alexander Stephen’s Corner-
stone Speech asserting that modern science had shown that African Ameri-
cans were born inferior to other Americans.
The decade of the 1860s thus began with Stephens’s challenge to the
“born free and equal” idea, and it ended with the triumph of that idea both
in the Federal Constitution and in the state constitutions.  The Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments helped operationalize the “born free and
equal” ideal of the 1780s and thus removed one of the most appalling struc-
tural defects in the original Constitution.  It would take another half century
to extend that ideal further by guaranteeing the vote to women, but this pro-
cess involved the removal of defects from a basic structure that is grounded
in sound observations about the human condition rather than a rejection of
the basic principles of representative democracy and separation of powers.
This is a long-winded way of saying that the Constitution, as corrected by
some amendments, especially those of the 1860s, is a very good way to run a
government if a government one must have.
In Europe, the 1860s were ushered in with the 1859 publication of John
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.121  Mill’s book had a huge impact in the United
118 Id. at 674.
119 CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 713 (1852) (statement of Rep. Norton S.
Townshend).
120 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 120 (1861) (statement of Rep. John F.
Farnsworth).
121 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
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States, in the British Empire, and in Continental Europe.  Many Europeans
in the 1860s were classical liberals, and the United Kingdom, France, and the
German states were all moving in a classical liberal direction.  Feudalism and
absolute monarchy were dead or were on the way out almost everywhere in
Western Europe.  This was a rejection of the idea of caste and an acknowledg-
ment that all men were created equal.
To be sure, there were intellectual storm clouds on the horizon.  Racial-
ist thinking, which culminated in the eugenics craze, was about to get a big
pseudoscientific push from absurd misapplications of Darwinian teaching,
and great-power imperialism would lead European countries, and eventually
the United States as well, to “Take up the White Man’s burden,”122 in Rudy-
ard Kipling’s infamous phrase, to govern what were supposedly inferior races
of people.123  And the status of women as second-class citizens would remain
unresolved for many decades.
But, on balance, the zeitgeist of the 1860s in the United States was best
characterized by the triumph of the “born free and equal” idea, which is part
of the original meaning of the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment, over the racist
idea of the inferiority of African Americans advanced by Alexander Stephens.
The most poignant observation we can make of that time is that the 1860s
was the decade of “The Battle Hymn of the Republic.”124
D. The Present Day
The “present day” begins for us on December 10, 1948, when the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, Eleanor Roosevelt, appointed by Presi-
dent Truman, secured the ratification by the United Nations of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.125  Eleanor Roosevelt was then FDR’s widow
and Theodore Roosevelt’s niece.  In other words, she represented the Ameri-
can elite.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in light
of the revulsion and horror generated when the victorious Allied Armed
forces crushed Hitler and the Nazis only to discover that Hitler had killed,
inter alia, six million Jews in the Holocaust.  The Declaration begins as
follows:
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in
a spirit of brotherhood.
122 Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden, MCCLURE’S MAG., Feb. 1899, at 290.
123 On the flagrant unconstitutionality of denying constitutional rights to inhabitants of
American territories, a practice which took hold in the early 1900s, see GARY LAWSON &
GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 121–50 (2004).
124 JULIA WARD HOWE, The Battle Hymn of the Republic (1862).
125 Drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://
research.un.org/en/undhr (last updated Aug. 22, 2017).
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Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.  Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of
the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory
to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-gov-
erning or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall
be prohibited in all their forms.126
Quite obviously, these articles of the Declaration of Human Rights are a
global affirmation of the continuing goodness of the “born free and equal”
idea of the Enlightenment, of the 1780s, and of the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments adopted in the 1860’s.  It is an explicit repudiation of
the 1930s and of the belief in that era in eugenics and government by
experts.  Of course, if a constitutional text had been enacted in the 1930s
which incorporated the antirepublican ideas of that era, then the only
recourse for a constitutionalist would be to seek to change the Constitution
or, perhaps, to abandon it for an alternative form of governance.  No such
text was enacted.  None of the institutions that represent the worst elements
of the modern administrative state was validated by constitutional amend-
ment.  Nor do those institutions reflect the Constitution of 1788 or the Con-
stitution of 1868, as we now proceed to demonstrate.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The U.S. Constitution, as did all of the state constitutions of the found-
ing era, rests on a division of governmental authority into the categories of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers.  “All legislative Powers herein
granted” are vested in the Congress, and the “executive Power” and “judicial
Power” are vested, respectively, in the President and the federal courts.127
None of the founding-era constitutions provided technical definitions of
these three heads of power.  That is not because there was no expectation of
disagreement or conflict.  As James Madison wrote:
Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science of government has
yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces, the legislative, executive, and judiciary . . . . Questions daily
126 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
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occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in
these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.128
Nonetheless, as one of us has written:
That adept-puzzling obscurity . . . did not stop Madison from categori-
cally declaring that various powers of government are “in their nature . . .
legislative, executive, or judiciary.”  Nor did it stop John Adams from stating
that the “three branches of power have an unalterable foundation in nature;
that they exist in every society natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative
and executive authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws
depend entirely on a separation of them in the frame of government.”  Nor
did it prevent many state constitutions of the founding era from including
separation-of-powers clauses that expressly distinguished, again without
express definitions, legislative, executive, and judicial powers.  Nor did it
prevent the United States Constitution from basing its entire scheme of gov-
ernance on the distinctions between those powers.  However difficult it may
be at the margins to distinguish the categories of power from each other, the
founding generation assumed that there was a fact of the matter about those
distinctions and that one could discern that fact in at least a large range of
cases.  The communicative meaning of the Constitution of 1788 cannot be
ascertained without reference to some such distinction, even if legal scholars
or political scientists (adept or otherwise) find the distinction unhelpful or
confusing.129
The text of the U.S. Constitution does not create a headless fourth
branch of unaccountable administrative agency experts, possessed of the
“administrative” power,130 but it does embody a textual commitment to the
separation of powers that implements the Madisonian system of checks and
balances.  It is well known that many modern regulatory agencies blend
together in one agency the exercise of the legislative, executive, and judicial
power.131  We will argue that this is unconstitutional, unnecessary, and
unwise.  We think we can have a better administrative state132 if we adhere to
the separation of powers in the way that we will argue for in this article.
Our concerns are inspired by article XXX of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion of 1780, which provides that:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the exec-
utive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of
them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
128 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 286 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1866).
129 Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please!: The Original Insignificance of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 623–24 [hereinafter Lawson, Take
the Fifth] (footnotes omitted).
130 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 560–68 (1994).
131 James Landis knew it and celebrated it. See LANDIS, supra note 39, at 1–2, 10–12.
132 Professor Lawson adds: “if an administrative state one must have.”
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or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of
men.133
Separation of powers clauses like the one above were present in twenty-
nine out of thirty-seven state constitutions in 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, and such clauses can be found today in forty out of
fifty state constitutions.134  In both time periods, more than three-quarters of
the States—an Article V consensus—contained separation of powers clauses
in their state constitutions.135  James Madison tried to include such a clause
in the U.S. Constitution,136 only to be told it was unnecessary because it was
so obvious already that the U.S. Constitution was committed to the separa-
tion of powers through the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III.137  The
separation of powers is and always has been a key part of the U.S.
Constitution.
The federal constitutional separation of powers, unlike some pure theo-
retical models that were not in fact adopted as part of the constitutional text,
does not require a hermetic separation of functions among the legislative,
executive, and judicial actors.  It does, however, require that actors perform
only those functions for which they have an enumerated power or which are
incidental to performance of an enumerated power.  Members of Congress
or the Attorney General cannot preside over a criminal trial because their
enumerated powers do not include that particular function.138  Congress
cannot confer that power by statute, because the Necessary and Proper
Clause only authorizes laws that confer incidental powers that are “necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution” principal powers, and a law purport-
ing to let a non-judge preside over a criminal trial would be none of the
above.139  Federal judges can perform that function because they are granted
the enumerated “judicial Power.”140  For the same reason, federal judges can-
not enact laws.  The judicial power does not include that function, no other
power is directly given to federal judges by the Constitution, and a congres-
sional statute purporting to confer that power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause would be trying to confer a principal rather than incidental
power (and to boot would fail to be “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” other federal powers).
The administrative state makes hash out of this basic allocation of consti-
tutional powers.  Everybody knows this.  A quarter century ago, one of us
catalogued some of the most obvious ways in which the administrative state is
133 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX.
134 See Calabresi et al., supra note 90, at 141, 143.
135 See id.
136 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453, 448 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
137 See id. at 789.
138 See Gary Lawson, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication: The America Invents Act
Through a Constitutional Lens, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Law-
son, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication].
139 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
140 Id. art. III, § 1.
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unconstitutional,141 and we frankly do not believe that anyone seriously
thinks that the Constitution of 1788’s original meaning can validate the full
scope of the modern administrative state.  That is just too clear for extended
argument, and so we do not argue it here.  Instead, in this Article, we seek to
accomplish three goals.  First, we identify what we have learned in the past
twenty-five years about the constitutional infirmities of the administrative
state; scholarship has shed some important new light on old arguments.  Sec-
ond, we show how the administrative state not only violates the constitutional
separation of powers but also violates norms of due process of law that infuse
the Constitution and that find textual confirmation in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.  Third, we offer some practical suggestions for relatively
modest reforms that will alleviate at least some of the grave constitutional
defects in the administrative state, with few consequences for the actual scope
of modern government.142
A. Administrative Agency Incursions on Legislative Power
The most blatant way in which the administrative state violates the con-
stitutional separation of powers is the vast subdelegation of legislative author-
ity that permeates modern government.  As the law presently stands, both
executive and independent administrative agencies engage heavily in formal
and informal policymaking, through both rulemaking and adjudication, even
on major issues such as how to respond to claims of global warming or
whether there is or is not such a thing as clean coal.  Congress has subdele-
gated enormous power to make law and policy over matters like these to the
executive department and independent agencies (and indirectly, to a modest
extent, to the courts, which can review agency policymaking to determine
whether it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”143).  All of these agencies, even those that are formally
independent, are dominated by presidential personnel.  Thus, when Presi-
dent Trump replaced President Obama, there was, in effect, a huge change
in the law without a single member of Congress casting a vote.
This is the result of decades of Congress enacting vacuous statutes and
thereby subdelegating to the agencies the power to make law.  The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), for example, has the power to grant
broadcast licenses “if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served
141 See Lawson, Rise of the Administrative State, supra note 37, at 1233.
142 The most obvious problem with the modern federal government is that it engages
in activities that no institution or combination of institutions of the national government is
constitutionally authorized to perform.  We do not address that problem in this Article.
Here, we focus on matters of form, reflected in the separation of powers and due process of
law.  We propose reforms that we think can and should be accepted even by people who
believe that all of the present functions of the national government should be maintained.
143 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
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thereby.”144  This law is representative, not extraordinary.  While the NIRA
was found unconstitutional in 1935,145 smaller, more localized versions of
the institution, with equally open-ended statutory authorizations, have been
consistently upheld over the past eight decades.  Since its heroic stand in
Schechter Poultry in 1935, the Supreme Court has uniformly rejected nondele-
gation doctrine challenges to organic statutes like the Communications Act
of 1934 because it thinks that judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doc-
trine would enmesh the federal courts in the making of policy decisions
about which subdelegations go too far and which do not go far enough.146
Agencies like the FCC regulate net neutrality one way under Obama and
entirely the other way under Trump.  This erodes business confidence in
investing because the law can change 180 degrees every time we elect a Presi-
dent.  Businesses and investors want certainty, and the current system does
not provide that.  More to the point, these vacuous statutes are rather bla-
tantly unconstitutional.  The case for this obvious claim has been made
numerous times from several overlapping directions.  “Indeed, there are few
propositions of constitutional meaning as thoroughly overdetermined as the
unconstitutionality of subdelegations of legislative authority.”147  We knew
this twenty-five years ago, and we know it today.  But today we know a bit
better why this is so.
One can find subdelegation unconstitutional by looking to inferences
from structure,148 by seeing subdelegation as a threat to the larger constitu-
tional principle of representative democracy,149 or by interpreting the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to view subdelegation of legislative authority as
improper.150  All of these arguments have something to commend them, but
we have learned in recent years that they all are subsumed within a larger
argument that more firmly establishes the impermissibility of legislative sub-
delegation.  This argument stems from major scholarship emanating from
Robert Natelson and Philip Hamburger, and one of us has spent a lot of
energy trying to develop their insights.
The Constitution is best seen as a kind of agency instrument.  The book-
length argument for this proposition is found in a recent work coauthored by
one of us.151  For purposes of subdelegation analysis, the precise form of
144 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012).  For more on the sheer scope of delegation in the mod-
ern administrative state, see Gary Lawson, Representative/Senator Trump?, 21 CHAP. L. REV.
111, 114 (2018) [hereinafter Lawson, Representative/Senator].
145 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
146 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–74, 378–79 (1989); id. at 415–16
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
147 Lawson, Representative/Senator, supra note 144, at 119.
148 See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelega-
tion Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 263 (2005) [hereinafter Lawson, Discretion as
Delegation].
149 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136–37 (1995).
150 See Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 148, at 249–67.
151 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING
THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).  The book was inspired, and helped along immeasur-
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agency instrument that best describes the Constitution does not matter.152  It
was settled agency law in the eighteenth century that delegated discretionary
powers in an agency instrument—any relevant agency instrument—could
not be subdelegated absent a specific authorization in the instrument.153
The Constitution contains no such authorization for Congress to subdele-
gate, so no such power exists.  Members of Congress must personally exercise
their delegated legislative power, just as stewards or guardians must person-
ally exercise the authority with which they have been entrusted.  None of this
solves the difficult problem of determining when legislation entrusts such a
kind or quality of discretion to executive (or judicial) actors that it amounts
to subdelegation of authority,154 but it grounds the basic principle against
subdelegation firmly in the Constitution’s very character as a legal instru-
ment.155  Once one sees the Constitution through the lens of agency, “[t]he
rule against subdelegation of legislative authority is among the clearest con-
stitutional rules one can imagine.”156
Beyond being unconstitutional, there is a huge cost to our republican
institutions that results from Congress having given the agencies carte blanche
to legislate.  Part of that cost is that Congress has given up too much of the
legislative power to presidential appointees and so Congress is too weak vis-a`-
vis Presidents who have learned to use the agencies’ rulemaking powers as
their own.  This weakens our constitutional democracy, weakens Congress,
and leads to a kind of hyper-presidentialism, which we think is unhealthy—if
only because it raises the stakes in presidential elections to levels that the
original constitutional design never contemplated.157  Regulatory law lurches
sharply in one direction under President Obama and sharply in another
direction under President Trump.  These sudden lurches are not good for
individuals or for people trying to start or run a business and who are eager
to know “what the law is,” and they lead to an “us vs. them” mentality in
presidential elections from which nothing good can come.
The Supreme Court has decided not to enforce the constitutional prin-
ciple against subdelegation, but there is a legislative effort now afoot in Con-
gress to reclaim some of the power that Congress has subdelegated to
ably, by Rob Natelson, who really uncovered for modern eyes the agency character of the
Constitution that was taken for granted by the founding generation and then was somehow
lost to modernity.
152 For other purposes, it might matter whether the Constitution is seen as more like a
power of attorney than, for example, a corporate charter.  For purposes of subdelegation
analysis, the precise characterization makes no difference.
153 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 151, at 113–17.
154 This problem was recognized by Chief Justice John Marshall at an early date, see
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43, 46, (1825), and the problem has not
gotten easier with age. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327, 378–91 (2002) [hereinafter Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning].
155 For a much longer version of this argument, see Lawson, Discretion as Delegation,
supra note 148, at 263–64.
156 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 151, at 117.
157 See Lawson, Representative/Senator, supra note 144, at 113–14.
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agencies.  The current vehicle is the Regulations from the Executive in Need
of Scrutiny Act (“REINS Act”), which would require Congress to assume
some measure of responsibility for enactment of so-called “major” rules.158  A
version of this statute passed the House in 2011159 and again in 2017.160
This is at least a baby step in the right direction, though the 2017 version
contains an unconstitutional legislative veto provision.161  Accordingly, we
believe that Congress should instead pass an Administrative Procedure Act of
2018, which would require that any formal or informal rule that the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) finds would have an effect on the national econ-
omy of $100 million a year or more162 be presented to the House of
Representatives and the Senate for consideration on a fast track calendar,
whereby each House would vote the rule up or down, with no Senate filibus-
ter allowed, within thirty days of the rule’s referral to Congress.  If either
House votes the proposed regulation down, it will die.  If both Houses
approve the rule, it shall be presented to the President, and it shall become
law either if he signs it or if it is passed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of
Congress over the president’s veto.  In other words, major rules can only
become law through a normal (though procedurally expedited) Article I,
Section 7 lawmaking process.
This statute would allow interstitial regulatory rulemaking as to small
matters, while returning to Congress and the President the power to legislate
as to all big matters.  This proposal would help put Congress back into busi-
ness as the chief lawmaking entity instead of having that role being played by
executive-controlled personnel in the agencies.
It is also worth considering whether the federal courts should use an
impact on the national economy of more than $100 million a year (however
that impact is measured163) as a benchmark for determining whether there
has been an unconstitutional delegation of power by Congress to an agency,
which would give our proposed policy prescription a measure of constitu-
tional status.  On the one hand, that dollar amount is a poor proxy for the
true constitutional rule, which must look holistically at the character and
quality of the discretion granted to the executive agents in light of the spe-
158 H.R. 26, 115th Cong. (2017).
159 For discussion of the 2011 version, see Jonathan H. Adler, Placing “REINS” on Regu-
lations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013) (arguing
that the bill was both constitutional and reasonable); Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and
the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013) (argu-
ing that the bill was constitutional but bad policy).
160 See 163 CONG. REC. D15 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/congres
sional-record/2017/01/05 (noting “[t]he House passed H.R. 26”).
161 H.R. 26, § 801(b)(1)–(2).
162 The REINS Act gives this function to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget.  H.R. 26, § 804(2).  We prefer the CBO
because it is an arm of Congress, and Congress should not farm out the job of determining
its own legislative obligations.  Why else does one have a CBO?
163 Courts could choose to defer to the CBO.
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cific statutory scheme involved.164  On the other hand, any change in the law
that has that big of an effect on the economy probably ought by definition to
be made by Congress; the monetary benchmark will surely be underinclusive
rather than overinclusive of those actions that, as a matter of original mean-
ing, violate the subdelegation doctrine.  And for those, such as the late Jus-
tice Scalia, who worry about the lack of judicial standards for applying a
constitutional principle against subdelegation,165 the $100 million a year
benchmark would give the Supreme Court the bright line it needs to police
the subdelegation doctrine in a neutral and nonpartisan way.  The line is
concededly arbitrary, but it is not obvious to us why an underinclusive arbi-
trary line is worse than no line at all.
To be sure, this is far from a perfect solution even apart from its possible
failure to match perfectly, or even match well, with the objectively correct
constitutional principle.  As others have noted with great sophistication in
precisely this context,166 the devil is in the details.  For example, many agen-
cies can make policy through adjudication as well as through rulemaking, so
it is possible that our proposed statute would push those agencies more
toward adjudication.  Whether that is a positive or negative development
depends on many factors, but it is a possible development.  It is also possible
that agencies will engage in gamesmanship by breaking up rules into small
components so that no single rule crosses the CBO threshold167 or will strate-
gically bundle rules together to make congressional rejection less likely
(equivalent to the congressional practice of omnibus bills).168  Again, the
consequences of such a development are not obvious.  Finally, our proposal
gives a good measure of power to the CBO, which can presumably find ways
to manipulate the process of calculating economic impacts.  We are not pro-
posing a cure-all solution to the problem of subdelegation.  We offer this
statute as a very modest first step.  If some of the possible eventualities occur,
Congress can reassess whether a simple dollar limit on rules is an effective
way to restore some measure of legislative responsibility.
There is also the small problem that we are calling upon Congress to
reclaim some of its authority when that selfsame Congress is the entity that
created the subdelegation problem in the first place.  To be sure, subdelega-
tion requires the complicity of the executive and the judiciary to be effective,
but no subdelegation happens unless Congress initiates it.  Why would we
think that Congress would suddenly change its practices?  We are by no
means sure that it will.  In fact, it probably will not.  But right now, we are
facing a rare moment when it is at least conceivable.  We have a President
who ran against both parties.  The establishment of both parties dislikes him
intensely.  If there is ever going to be a time that is propitious for a modest
revival of congressional responsibility, perhaps even along bipartisan lines,
164 See Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note 154, at 376–77.
165 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166 See Rappaport, supra note 26, at 122–23.
167 See id. at 125.
168 See id. at 127.
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this may be it.  We should be giving it every form of encouragement while the
moment lasts.
We think this modest approach is preferable to the full-blown surrender
proposed by Professor Metzger.  She assumes that massive legislative subdele-
gation is a foregone conclusion.169  From that premise, she argues that a vast,
technocratic, 1930s-style administrative state is actually a constitutional require-
ment: “[T]he modern national administrative state is the constitutionally
mandated consequence of delegation.”170  Her claim is that if Congress sub-
delegates authority, we must all restructure the entire scheme of governance
in order to make that subdelegation as effective as possible.171  In other
words, because there has been a breach in the wall of separation of powers,
one has to tear down the entire wall.  (Does this also mean, we ask in all
seriousness, that the brute fact of subdelegation requires—constitutionally
requires—that only technocrats be allowed to vote?  If not, why not?  Would
that not improve the effectiveness of the post-subdelegation government?)
This is entirely backwards.  If subdelegation is a constitutional error, as we
think it rather obviously is, we should be looking to minimize its impact
rather than maximize it.  If one is going to make second-best arguments for
the deliberate creation of offsetting errors, the new errors should be offset-
ting rather than error enhancing.  They need to move toward the constitu-
tional baseline rather than further away from it.172  For example, one can
perhaps make a second-best argument for an unconstitutional legislative
veto, because it enhances the role of Congress in the legislative process,173
but just saying, “Well, Congress messed up, so let’s turn everything over to
the technocrats,” makes no sense.
We do not doubt that if Metzger, or James Landis, or Felix Frankfurter,
were in charge of drafting a new constitution, it would include provisions for
a robust subdelegation of legislative power to the administrative state.  No
such document has been drafted, proposed, and ratified.  The Constitution
169 See Metzger, supra note 4, at 88–89.  Metzger claims that “very few anti-administra-
tivists [her term for people who have legal and policy views that she doesn’t like] are will-
ing to call . . . delegation[s] of power into serious constitutional question.” Id. at 7.  Really?
She needs to get out more.
170 Id. at 89.
171 Id. at 7.
172 To be fair to Metzger, this point is not as obvious as it might seem.  The whole point
of second-best theory is that if one is not already at the equilibrium point, moves that do
not fully reach equilibrium have indeterminate effects.  It might be the case that a specific
move “away” from equilibrium actually gets one “closer” to the equilibrium than a specific
move “toward” it. See GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS 139–41,
145–46 (2017).  But the equilibrium on which Metzger focuses is not the structure of the
Constitution.  It is something called “effective governance.” See Metzger, supra note 4, at
85–87.  We have searched in vain for the “effective governance” clause on which to ground
a constitutional revolution—or for a definition of “effective governance” sufficiently fixed
in eighteenth-century natural or positive law to serve as a preconstitutional norm.
173 See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23–40 (1994).
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that we have contains instead a robust principle against legislative subdelega-
tion.  Even if courts choose not to enforce that principle, nothing says that
Congress cannot take steps, even small steps, toward reclaiming its proper
authority.  And, of course, nothing says that the executive has to go along
with Congress’s decision to subdelegate if that decision is unconstitu-
tional.174  Does Metzger think that it would be unconstitutional for the Presi-
dent to veto a bill on the grounds that it unconstitutionally subdelegates
legislative power?  That it would be unconstitutional for the President to allo-
cate enforcement resources toward constitutional statutes and away from
unconstitutional subdelegating statutes?  That it would be unconstitutional
for the President to appoint Supreme Court Justices who are inclined to
enforce a subdelegation doctrine?  If the Constitution were amended to con-
tain an explicit subdelegation clause, the answers to all of these questions
might be yes.  Until that happens, the choice is whether or not to try to follow
the Constitution.  Metzger has chosen “not.”  That is an entirely defensible
choice if one thinks—as one might very well think—that the Constitution is
outdated or normatively undesirable.  But then one should have the courage
of one’s convictions and just say so.
B. Agencies and Presidential Power
Much of separation of powers law and scholarship over the past half cen-
tury has focused on presidential control of the administrative machinery.
Perhaps no subject in this area has consumed as much attention as the ques-
tion of presidential removal of executive officials.  To what extent can Con-
gress statutorily insulate certain officials from presidential dismissal?  Modern
doctrine has not prescribed precise limits on the kinds and forms of for-cause
removal provisions that Congress can enact for executive officials, though it
is reasonably clear that some degree of insulation for at least some officials—
primarily heads of multimember regulatory agencies—will be sustained by a
majority of the current Supreme Court.175  As a matter of original meaning,
Professor Calabresi thinks it is clear that the President has untrammeled con-
stitutional authority to remove any subordinate executive official (save the
Vice President, whose tenure is constitutionally determined).  He believes
this because George III and all thirteen of the colonial governors who served
from the founding of Jamestown in 1607 until American independence in
1776 could have legally removed any nonjudicial subordinate officer and
prior to 1776 any judicial officer.  There were quite simply no independent
agencies in seventeenth- or eighteenth-century England or North America.
Professor Lawson is dubitante—as he was a quarter century ago.176
We know a great deal more than we did twenty-five years ago about the
history and tradition of presidential control over the executive machinery.
174 See Lawson, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication, supra note 138, at 39 (urging Presi-
dent Trump to resist legislative subdelegations).
175 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988).
176 See Lawson, Rise of the Administrative State, supra note 37, at 1244 n.74.
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We know that preconstitutional executives uniformly had the power of
removal.  We know that there is no settled tradition of presidential acquies-
cence in legislative attempts to divide executive power.177  We know that
presidential control of the executive dates to the founding era.178  And we
know that some judicial precedents upholding limits on presidential control
of subordinates that formerly seemed unassailable now show at least some
small cracks.179  These are all significant developments in our understanding
of Article II.  Professor Calabresi believes that this learning confirms that the
Constitution vests in the President the unlimited power to remove
subordinate executive officials.  Professor Lawson is still not entirely sure
about that.  He fully agrees that the Constitution requires that the President
control all exercises of executive power, but he believes that this means that
the President has the formally-greater-than-removal, if perhaps practically-
less-useful-than-removal, power to nullify any action by a subordinate that is
contrary to presidential directives.  The President might even have the power
directly to assume any discretionary power vested in a subordinate official.
Professor Lawson is just not certain about a power of removal as the constitu-
tionally required mechanism for implementing that directorial power.
But even if presidential removal is not constitutionally mandated—and
Professor Lawson is not by any means ruling out that prospect, as there is a
very good historical argument that the executive power just includes, as a
matter of original meaning, a power to remove subordinates—it is a good
idea.  Agency heads who are “independent” of the President are, by virtue of
that fact, independent of the voters as well.  Such heads are surely “accounta-
ble” in a sense to their peers, but creating a self-perpetuating, self-regulating
caste of credentialed experts is precisely what we are trying to avoid.
Officials are only independent if statutes make them so.  Accordingly, we
think that Congress should specify by statute that all executive department
officers are removable at will by the President.  Congress should so state in an
Administrative Procedure Act of 2018.  This would legislatively overturn the
Supreme Court’s foolish decision in Humphrey’s Executor.180  Alternatively, the
Court could say, or Congress could make clear by statute, that refusal to fol-
low a presidential order is itself “good cause” for removing an executive
branch officer under the many statutes requiring a finding of “good cause”
for removal.181
177 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDEN-
TIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 22–29 (2008).
178 See SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 10–11 (2015).
179 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84
(2010).
180 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).  Even if Professor Law-
son ultimately concludes that the Constitution does not require a presidential removal
power, he would reach that conclusion through a very different path than did the Court in
the nonsensical Humphrey’s Executor decision.
181 While direct authority is thin, it is widely assumed that statutory “good cause” provi-
sions do not permit presidential removal of an official for mere policy disagreements. See
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To be sure, this would have the effect of increasing presidential power,
which, thanks to legislative subdelegation, has expanded beyond any plausi-
bly desirable boundaries.  But in the case of legislative subdelegation, the
increased presidential power comes at the expense of Congress.  In the case
of internal executive administration, it comes at the expense of bureaucrats.
Given that choice, we choose the electorally accountable (and more readily
impeachable) President as the lesser evil.182
In short, we think that all of the so-called “independent” regulatory
agencies should be recognized as fully a part of the executive department.
The United States of America is a democratic republic in which everyone is
born free and equal.  There should be no “experts” who can wield power that
is not directly controlled by the President, Congress, and the federal courts.
It is to agency interaction with the courts that we now turn.
C. Adjudication in Administrative Law
A quarter century ago, one of the most difficult constitutional questions
was the extent to which administrative actors could adjudicate disputes.  Arti-
cle III vests the judicial power in federal judges who have tenure during good
behavior and guarantees against diminishment of salary while in office.  But
what falls within the exclusive function represented by exercise of the judicial
power?  Much activity that is obviously executive in character involves applica-
tion of law to fact.  Even some legislative activity takes that form.  Which clas-
ses of disputes must be adjudicated by Article III judges?
A quarter century ago, one of us tentatively and hesitantly suggested that
an exercise of judicial power might be constitutionally necessary in order to
effect a deprivation of life, liberty, or property—allowing Congress to leave to
executive (or legislative) adjudication the determination of interests that do
not fall within those categories.183  Today, we assert that claim with much
more confidence.  The lengthy case for requiring federal judicial action for
deprivations of life, liberty, or property is made elsewhere,184 and we say a bit
more about it later in this Article.  To pursue that issue in depth, however,
would take us very far afield.  Instead, we focus here on a much narrower
problem.
We are very troubled by the current practice of adjudication in adminis-
trative law whereby agencies hire statutory administrative law judges
(“ALJs”),185 who share the same building and office space with agency law
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 15, 27–28 (2010).
182 Congress could, of course, impeach and remove individual officers, but that is an
ungainly way to maintain popular control over the executive machinery.
183 See Lawson, Rise of the Administrative State, supra note 37, at 1246–47.
184 See Lawson, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication, supra note 138, at 19–20.
185 See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).  The Supreme Court has correctly held that these ALJs
are constitutional “Officers” who must be appointed by the agency heads, acting as “Heads
of Departments,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, rather than by agency staff members. See
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).
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enforcement and prosecutorial personnel, and who initially hear administra-
tive law cases, subject to review by the agency that made the rule and that
prosecuted the case it now adjudicates, subject to deferential review by the
Article III courts.  To us, this violation of separation of powers principles is
simply not a good idea whether or not it is constitutional.
Other great Western democracies such as the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the French Republic, and the Italian Republic all have a separate sys-
tem of ALJs serving in their own building and enjoying the equivalent of
tenure during good behavior.  Comparative constitutional law thus suggests
that the U.S. administrative law system is primitive and underdeveloped.
We therefore propose that all the current ALJs assigned to agencies
whose actions deprive a person of life, liberty, or property be defunded and
that Congress should appropriate funds to create new Article III Administra-
tive Law Courts, the judges of which should be nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.186  These new Article III judges should be
called “Federal Administrative Law Judges,” and they should be given tenure
during good behavior and Article III salary guarantees.  Funds should be
appropriated to build a new Federal Administrative Law courthouse where
those judges will not rub shoulders with prosecutors in the cafeteria, as is
presently the case.  We would pay the Article III ALJs the same salary as is
paid to current statutory ALJs, and we would also give them the same support
staff of clerks and secretaries.  But we would limit their jurisdiction to only
hearing cases coming from the commission or board or cabinet department
from which they originally came.187  As vacancies occur when ALJs retire or
die, we would rely on presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation to
pick new ALJs.
Our proposal would not apply to the hundreds of statutory ALJs and
hearing examiners who decide Social Security or disability cases or who rule
on tax and immigration claims.  The ALJs who we would turn into Article III
judges would be initially those in the EPA, the NLRB, the FCC, the FTC,
FERC, the SEC, and OSHA.  This would add only about 200 new federal
judges to the current Article III structure.  Given that Western democracies
like Germany, France, and Italy all have a separate civil-service-protected
administrative law judiciary, which is not in communication with prosecutors
or rulemakers, and which differs from the ordinary civil and criminal law
courts, we think this reform borrows something valuable from European
administrative law.
We think an argument can be made that the right to civil jury trial
should, as a policy matter, be available in administrative law cases where the
government is bringing an enforcement action, even though the Supreme
Court ruled this was not necessary in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
186 For a similar proposal, see Rappaport, supra note 26, at 142.
187 Professor Rappaport advocates a more generalist approach, in which Article III
administrative judges could hear cases from any agency as long as it was within the judge’s
specialized expertise. See id. at 142–43.  This particular devilish detail definitely merits
further discussion.
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Health Review Commission.188 Civil jury trial is most important not in civil suits
between two private persons, but in civil enforcement actions where the gov-
ernment is bearing down hard, and perhaps justifiably, on an individual or a
business.
We are acutely aware of the fact that jury trial in American civil and
criminal law cases is now being overwhelmingly replaced by arbitration and
settlement on the civil law side and by plea bargaining on the criminal law
side.  Ninety-five percent of all American criminal law cases are now decided
by plea bargaining.189  In light of these facts, we think it would be a mistake
as a policy matter to use traditional common-law twelve-person juries to
decide facts in administrative law.  We propose instead to use a mixed bench
of one United States Administrative Law Judge and two administrative law
jurors.  The jurors should be laypeople, who do not work for the government
at any level and who are suggested by the agency whose work is being
reviewed or by the litigants as having expertise in the relevant field of law.
The United States Administrative Law Judge should conduct voir dire to
determine that the proposed lay judges are impartial and are qualified to be
a lay judge in the field of law which is under review.  There should be no use
of peremptory challenges.
We would allow a verdict of damages or an injunction to be appealed
from the new Article III Administrative Law Judges directly to the relevant
federal circuit court of appeals, sidestepping the current system of the agency
judging cases that arise out of a rule it made and which its prosecutors
enforced.  To us, the current administrative law process makes the agencies
judges in their own cause, contrary to the rule of Dr. Bonham’s Case.190
While we have presented our proposal as a policy prescription, at least
part of this proposal for reforming the system of ALJs is constitutionally
mandatory, as we now explain.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND MAGNA CARTA
The American Constitution constructs a regime governed by the due
process of law.  This is evident in the Fifth Amendment, which provides that
no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”191  The principles represented by these words were part of the Con-
stitution of 1788; the December 15, 1791 ratification of the Bill of Rights
confirmed but did not create them.192
Perhaps the most important, or at least the most basic, of these princi-
ples is the principle of legality, which says that executive and judicial actors can
only act in accordance with preexisting law.  This idea goes back at least as far
188 430 U.S. 442, 460–61 (1977).
189 LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND
CHARGE BARGAINING 1 (2011).
190 Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646; 8 Co. Rep. 113b.
191 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
192 For a lengthy argument to this effect, see Lawson, Take the Fifth, supra note 129, at
616–17.
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as Magna Carta, a charter of liberty signed by King John at Runnymede in
1215 and repeatedly reissued later, most notably in 1225.  Article 39 of
Magna Carta reads as follows: “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or
disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send
against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the
land.”193  The influential 1225 reissuance of this provision said:
No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold,
of Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judg-
ment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land.  We will sell to no man, we will
not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.194
This is a strong denial of executive authority to act in the absence of law.
As interpolated by Edward Coke, by the seventeenth century this was under-
stood as a guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law.195  Coke’s ideas were widely popular in
Puritan New England and among the American revolutionaries.
What is due process of law under the U.S. Constitution?  It is a proceed-
ing before a life tenured Article III judge who has been nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, with the judge being advised by
enough lay people so that litigants will feel they have had the judgment of
their peers.  Only a judge with those qualifications, and under those con-
straints, can adjudicate a federal196 deprivation of someone’s life, liberty, or
property.
How do we know this?  Where does the Constitution say it?  We know it
because that is just what terms like legislative, executive, and judicial power
meant in 1788.  We know it because of a millennium-long tradition of “due
process of law” that limited both legislative and executive adjudication of
private rights, especially vested property rights. . . . The whole point of divid-
ing up governmental power among discrete institutions is to create distinct
roles for each actor.  The heart and soul of the judicial role is the adjudica-
tion of private rights.  There are reasons why the Constitution gave the Presi-
dent “executive” but not “judicial” power and gave the Congress various
“legislative” but not “judicial” powers.  The Constitution did not define the
precise contours of those powers because it assumed that readers would try
to read the document honestly, and that any honest reader would know
darned well that certain things just had to be done by courts, others by exec-
utives, and others by legislatures.197
The modern notion that “due process of law” concerns what procedures
federal executive agents must employ when making deprivations of constitu-
tionally protected interests is one of the most basic and fundamental of all
193 J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d ed. 1992).
194 9 Hen. III, ch. 29 (1225).
195 See Lawson, Take the Fifth, supra note 129, at 620.
196 Whether precisely the same principles inform the Due Process of Law Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a very difficult question that we do not address.
197 Lawson, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication, supra note 138, at 19–20.
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twentieth-century constitutional mistakes.  Due process of law “concerns what
the ‘executive Power’ can do, not how or by what procedures it can do it.”198
If there is law, the executive must comply with it.  If there is no law, the
executive cannot deprive people of life, liberty, or property, no matter how
impressive is the set of procedures that the executive actors choose to pro-
vide or that Congress chooses to prescribe.199  When dealing with executive
deprivations of rights, “procedural due process,” not “substantive due pro-
cess,” is the oxymoronic phrase.
Obviously, the government can cut off or reduce one’s welfare or Social
Security benefits without giving you a trial and a judgment of your peers.  We
find the modern equation of welfare benefits with constitutionally protected
property to be quite laughable and wrong.200  Most of the more than 2000
ALJs and hearing officers who work in the government deal with government
benefits programs and thus can remain as they are without being elevated to
Article III status.  But as soon as a government official deprives someone of
life, liberty, or property, that person needs to be part of the Article III judicial
system.
When the administrative state allows executive actors to dispose of peo-
ple’s lives, liberty, and property without full—and this means de novo—
review by Article III judges, it is violating some of the most deeply rooted and
fundamental precepts of the Anglo-American legal tradition.  Those precepts
inform, underlay, and drive the American Constitution.  The administrative
state, to the extent that it authorizes executive deprivations of life, liberty,
and property, is an affront to Magna Carta, the Constitution, and the princi-
ple of legality.201  We propose that all federal deprivations of life, liberty, or
property be adjudicated by proper Article III tribunals.
CONCLUSION
We thus conclude with what many will consider more of a whimper than
a bang.  We think we can better reconcile the administrative state with the
separation of powers while deflating our current system of hyperpresidential-
ism and eliminating many conflicts of interest that now exist.  We are not
calling for the elimination of any executive branch or independent agencies,
nor are we calling for any repeal of an organic agency statute.  We are simply
calling for applying the spirit of article XXX of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion of 1780—from an era that celebrated basic humanity rather than gradu-
ate degrees—to administrative law.
198 Lawson, Take the Fifth, supra note 129, at 626.  For a detailed discussion of this point,
see id. at 626, 631–44.
199 Congress can prescribe more procedures for executive agents to follow than the Con-
stitution requires.
200 See Lawson, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication, supra note 138, at 18.
201 In making this claim, we stand proudly with those who made similar claims in the
1930s. See Schiller, supra note 35, at 406.
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Intellectuals in the 1780s believed fervently in the idea that “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal,”202 and in the 1860s in the United States
most American intellectuals agreed with Abraham Lincoln’s statement in the
Gettysburg Address that the United States was “conceived in liberty and dedi-
cated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”203  Unfortunately,
by 1900 most intellectuals in the United States and Europe no longer
believed in that idea, at least in part because of the corrosive influence of
social Darwinism.204  This explains the post-1883 rise of Jim Crow segregation
in the United States.  After the Holocaust and World War II, most intellectu-
als again came to believe in the eighteenth-century idea that “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal,”205 as is made evident by the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights and, in the United States, by Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech.206  The original meaning of the Constitution
in the 1780s and of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 is thus morally supe-
rior to the evolved meaning of those texts prior to Brown v. Board of
Education.207
We are thus seeking to complete a full circle.  From the founding of the
United States through the Civil War, the “born free and equal” idea progres-
sively, if sometimes too slowly, advanced.  Following the Civil War, however,
and exploding into the early twentieth century, the intellectual climate
degraded into antirepublican, pro-statist ideology, which culminated in the
political developments of the 1930s.  After World War II, we—perhaps too
optimistically, but time will tell—see the resurgence of prorepublican,
proliberty ideas.  The 1930s should thus be viewed as a trough on the graph
of human progress, not as an ideal to be “built out” by modern institutions.
We think we are proposing a progressive reform, which expands individ-
ual rights, especially rights to due process of law, and which puts Congress
back in the business of making major policy.  We think we are bringing the
zeitgeist of the Enlightenment, the founding, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment into an administrative state which routinely violates individual liberty
and equality because all too much of it was forged during the despicable era
of the 1930s.
202 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 126.
203 Lincoln, supra note 112.
204 To be sure, the term “social Darwinism” was not commonly employed until after the
1940s, when Richard Hofstadter published his influential 1944 book Social Darwinism in
American Thought. See Thomas C. Leonard, Origins of the Myth of Social Darwinism: The Ambig-
uous Legacy of Richard Hofstadter’s Social Darwinism in American Thought, 71 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 37, 39–40 (2009).  We are using the term to describe a family of theories
that seek to draw morally and politically salient distinctions across persons on bases other
than those persons’ choices, whether or not those theories strictly trace their origins to
(mis)interpretations of Darwinian biology.  There is no doubt that some such family of
theories profoundly influenced the Progressive Era. See id. at 37.
205 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 126.
206 Martin Luther King, Jr., Remarks at the March on Washington: “I Have a
Dream . . .” (Aug. 28, 1963), https://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf.
207 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
